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GOOD STRATEGIES FOR THE
ITERATED PRISONER’S DILEMMA :
SMALE VS. MARKOV
ETHAN AKIN
Abstract. In 1980 Steven Smale introduced a class of strategies
for the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma which used as data the run-
ning average of the previous payoff pairs. This approach is quite
different from the Markov chain approach, common before and
since, which used as data the outcome of the just previous play,
the memory-one strategies. Our purpose here is to compare these
two approaches focusing upon good strategies which, when used
by a player, assure that the only way an opponent can obtain at
least the cooperative payoff is to behave so that both players re-
ceive the cooperative payoff. In addition, we prove a version for
the Smale approach of the so-called Folk Theorem concerning the
existence of Nash equilibria in repeated play. We also consider the
dynamics when certain simple Smale strategies are played against
one another.
Contents
1. Introduction 2
2. Plans for the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma 2
3. Good Plans 14
4. Separation Paths and the Folk Theorem 28
5. Competition Among Simple Smale Plans 40
6. Variations 47
References 50
Date: March, 2017.
Key words and phrases. Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, Smale, Good Strategies,
simple Smale plan.
2010 Mathematical Subject Classification 91A20, 91A22, 91A10.
1
ar
X
iv
:1
61
0.
05
26
2v
2 
 [m
ath
.D
S]
  1
5 A
pr
 20
17
2 ETHAN AKIN
1. Introduction
The Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma has been an object of consider-
able study ever since Axelrod’s description of the results of computer
tournaments [6] and Maynard Smith’s application of game theory to
evolutionary competition [13]. Most of this work has focused upon
what I call here Markov strategies, i.e. memory-one plans. Competi-
tion between two such stategies leads to a Markov process on the set of
outcomes, e.g. [9], [15] and various surveys cited below. Considerable
simulation work has been done to analyze numerically the competition
between such strategies, e.g.[12] and [19]. In this context, I charac-
terized in [3] and [5] certain so-called good strategies which ensured
that an opponent could receive at least the cooperative payoff only by
playing so that both players receive exactly the cooperative payoff. Re-
cently, Mike Shub pointed out to me that Steve Smale had described
in 1980 strategies which he called good [18]. These strategies use an
entirely different way of aggregating the data of past outcomes. While
there has been some work on Smale’s procedure, e.g. [1], [8] and [7],
most of the game theory literature has ignored it. For example, Smale’s
work is not referred to in [12], [14], [11], [16] or [17]. Our purpose here
is to compare the Smale and Markov procedures and especially to use
these to clarify the notion of a good strategy. In addition, we use
the Taylor-Jonker equations for evolutionary dynamics [21] to analyze
competition among certain simple Smale strategies.
The author would like to express his appreciation to the referee for
his helpful comments and corrections.
2. Plans for the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
We will focus mostly on the symmetric version of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma. Each of the two players, X and Y, has a choice between two
strategies, c and d. Thus, there are four outcomes which we list in
the order: cc, cd, dc, dd, where, for example, cd is the outcome when X
plays c and Y plays d. Either player can use a mixed strategy, random-
izing by choosing c with probability pc and d with the complementary
probability 1− pc.
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Each then receives a payoff. The following 2× 2 chart describes the
payoff to the X player. The transpose is the Y payoff.
(2.1)
X\Y c d
c R S
d T P
Alternatively, we can define the payoff vectors for each player by
(2.2) SX = (R, S, T, P ) and SY = (R, T, S, P ).
The payoffs are assumed to satisfy
(2.3) T > R > P > S and 2R > T + S,
but 2P might lie on either side of T + S.
In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the strategy c is cooperation. When both
players cooperate they each receive the reward for cooperation (= R).
The strategy d is defection. When both players defect they each receive
the punishment for defection (= P ). However, if one player cooperates
and the other does not, then the defector receives the large tempta-
tion payoff (= T ), while the hapless cooperator receives the very small
sucker’s payoff (= S). The condition 2R > T +S says that the reward
for cooperation is larger than the players would receive by dividing
equally the total payoff of a cd or dc outcome. Thus, the maximum
total payoff occurs uniquely at cc and that location is a strict Pareto
optimum, which means that at every other outcome at least one player
does worse. The cooperative outcome cc is clearly where the players
“should” end up. If they could negotiate a binding agreement in ad-
vance of play, they would agree to play c and each receive R. However,
the structure of the game is such that, at the time of play, each chooses
a strategy in ignorance of the other’s choice. Furthermore, the strategy
d strictly dominates strategy c. This means that, whatever Y’s choice
is, X receives a larger payoff by playing d than by using c. In the array
(2.1) each number in the d row is larger than the corresponding number
in the c row above it. Hence, X chooses d, and for exactly the same
reason, Y chooses d. So they are driven to the dd outcome with payoff
P for each.
In the search for a way to avoid the mutually inferior payoff (P, P ),
attention has focused upon repeated play. X and Y play repeated
rounds of the same game. For each round the players’ choices are made
independently, but each is aware of all of the previous outcomes. The
hope is that the threat of future retaliation will rein in the temptation
4 ETHAN AKIN
to defect in the current round. It is this Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
which we will consider here.
After the kth round the players receive payoffs Sk = (SkX , S
k
Y ) deter-
mined by the payoff matrix. For a single payoff after N rounds of play
we use the time average:
sN = (sNX , s
N
Y ) =
1
N
ΣNk=1 S
k.(2.4)
Observe that
(2.5) sN+1 =
N
N + 1
sN +
1
N + 1
SN+1.
and so
(2.6) sN+1 − sN = 1
N + 1
(SN+1 − sN).
The vector sN = (sNX , s
N
Y ) lies in S defined to be the convex hull of
the four payoff pairs. If P < (T + S)/2, then S is a quadrilateral with
vertices: (S, T ), (R,R), (P, P ), (T, S). If P ≥ (T + S)/2, then S is the
triangle with vertices: (S, T ), (R,R), (T, S), which contains (P, P ).
The Euclidean diameter of the set S is
√
2(T − S). For  > 0 we
will call N∗ an  time-step when N∗ >
√
2(T − S)/. In that case, for
N ≥ N∗ the distance ||sN+1 − sN || of the step from sN to sN+1 is less
than .
Proposition 2.1. For any infinite sequence of outcomes, the set Ω of
limit points of the sequence {sN} of payoff pairs is closed, connected
subset of S. If U is an open subset of S which contains Ω, then there
exists N∗ such that sN ∈ U for all N ≥ N∗.
Proof: From (2.6) it is clear that ||sN+1 − sN || → 0 as N →∞. So
the conclusion is immediate from the following well-known lemma.
2
For the lemma we introduce a bit of notation.
For A a nonempty, closed subset of a compact metric space X and
x ∈ X we let d(x,A) = inf{d(x, a) : a ∈ A}. If B is another nonempty,
closed subset we let d(A,B) = inf{d(a, b) : a ∈ A, b ∈ B}. By com-
pactness, there exists a ∈ A such that d(x,A) = d(x, a), a point in A
closest to x, and there exist a ∈ A, b ∈ B such that d(A,B) = d(a, b).
Given  > 0 we let V(A) denote the open set {x : d(x,A) < }, i.e. the
set of points less than  away from a point of A.
Lemma 2.2. Let {xN} be a sequence in a compact metric space X.
If d(xN+1, xN) → 0 as N → ∞ then the set of limit points Ω is a
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nonempty, closed, connected subset of X. If U is an open set containing
Ω then there exists N∗ such that xN ∈ U for all N ≥ N∗.
Proof: The set limit points Ω is the intersection of the decreasing
sequence {Xk} with Xk the closure of the tail {xN : N ≥ k} of the
sequence. If U is an open set containing Ω then {U} and {X \ Xk :
k = 1, . . . } is an open cover of X and so has a finite subcover. Since
the Xk’s are decreasing, it follows that for some N∗, {U,X \XN∗} is
a cover of X. Hence, {xN : N ≥ N∗} ⊂ U . If Ω were empty we could
apply this to U = ∅ and get a contradiction.
Now let A0 and A1 be disjoint nonempty, closed subsets of Ω. We
will see that Ω \ (A0 ∪ A1) is nonempty and this implies that Ω is
connected. Let 3 be the distance between the sets d(A0, A1). Choose
n∗ so that d(xN+1, xN) <  for all N ≥ n∗.
The sequence repeatedly approaches arbitrarily closely to each point
of Ω. Since A0 and A1 are nonempty we can define n0 to be the min-
imum n ≥ n∗ such that xn lies in V(A0). Inductively, for k ≥ 0,
define n2k+1 to be the minimum n ≥ n2k such that xn ∈ V(A1), and
for k ≥ 1, n2k define n2k to be the minimum n ≥ n2k−1 such that
xn ∈ V(A0). It is clear that xni−1 ∈ V2(A0) \ V(A0) if i is even and is
in V2(A1) \ V(A1) if i is odd. Hence, the subsequence {xni−1} lies in
the closed set X \ (V(A0) ∪ V(A1)) and so it has limit points not in
A0 ∪ A1.
2
The choice of play for the first round is the initial play. A strategy is
a choice of initial play together with what we will call a plan. A plan is
a choice of play, after the first round, to respond to any possible past
history of outcomes in the previous rounds.
If X and Y use strategies with only pure strategy choices then the
result is an infinite sequence of outcomes. However, if mixed strategy
choices are used either on the initial plays or as part of the plan there
results a probability measure on the space of all such sequences.
We will consider plans which use just a crucial portion of the past
history data.
We will use the label Markov plan for a stationary, memory-one
plan which bases its response entirely on the outcome of the previous
round. For example, the Tit-for-Tat plan, hereafter TFT , due to Ana-
tol Rapoport, plays the opponent’s response from the previous play.
With the outcomes listed in order as cc, cd, dc, dd, a Markov plan for
X is given by a vector p = (p1, p2, p3, p4) = (pcc, pcd, pdc, pdd) where
pz is the probability of playing c when the outcome z occurred in
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the previous round. On the other hand, if Y also uses a Markov
plan q = (q1, q2, q3, q4) then the response vector is (qcc, qcd, qdc, qdd) =
(q1, q3, q2, q4) and the successive outcomes follow a Markov chain with
transition matrix given by:
(2.7) M =

p1q1 p1(1− q1) (1− p1)q1 (1− p1)(1− q1)
p2q3 p2(1− q3) (1− p2)q3 (1− p2)(1− q3)
p3q2 p3(1− q2) (1− p3)q2 (1− p3)(1− q2)
p4q4 p4(1− q4) (1− p4)q4 (1− p4)(1− q4)
 .
Notice the switch in numbering from the Y strategy q to the Y response
vector. This is done because switching the perspective of the players
interchanges cd and dc. This way the “same” plan for X and for Y is
given by the same vector. For example, TFT for X and for Y is given
by p = q = (1, 0, 1, 0), but the response vector for Y is (1, 1, 0, 0). The
plan Repeat is given by p = q = (1, 1, 0, 0) with the response vector
for Y equal to (1, 0, 1, 0). This plan just repeats the previous play,
regardless of what the opponent did.
We can think of a Markov chain on a finite set I (in this case I =
{cc, cd, dc, dd}) as representing motion on a directed graph with vertices
I and an edge from i1 to i2 if there is a positive probability, according
to M, of moving from i1 to i2, i.e. Mi1i2 > 0. In particular, there is
an edge from i to itself when Mii > 0. A path in the graph is a state
sequence i1, ..., in with n > 1 such that there is an edge from ik to ik+1
for k = 1, ..., n− 1. A set of states J ⊂ I is called a closed set when it
is nonempty and no path that begins in J can exit J . For example, the
entire set of states is closed and for any i the set of states accessible via
a path that begins at i is a closed set. The subset J is called a terminal
set when it is closed and when for i1, i2 ∈ J there exists a path from
i1 to i2. Equivalently, a terminal set is a minimal closed set. Since the
set is closed, the path moves only on elements of J .
A vector v is a stationary distribution for M when vi ≥ 0,Σivi =
1 and vM = v. For a terminal set J there is a unique stationary
distribution vector vJ such that (vJ)i = 0 for i 6∈ J . Furthermore,
(vJ)i > 0 for i ∈ J . Restricted to a terminal set, the system is ergodic
and so for any function f : I → R the sequence of time averages
{ 1
N
ΣNk=1f(i
k) : T = 1, 2, . . . } converges with probability 1 to the space
average Σi∈J(vJ)if(i), the expected value with respect to vJ . That is,
such convergence occurs except on a set of outcome sequences which
has probability 0. Think of the outcome sequence for a fair coin such
that Heads comes up every time.
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Distinct terminal sets are disjoint. If i ∈ I lies in some terminal
set then it is called recurrent ; otherwise, it is called transient. If i is
transient then for each terminal set J there is a probability, determined
by i and M so that the process beginning from i eventually enters J .
This probability might be zero but when summed over all of terminal
sets the probabilities add up to 1. If the process enters J then the time
average for any function f approaches the expected value with respect
to vJ with probability 1.
The matrix M is called convergent when there is a unique terminal
set J . In that case, vJ is the unique stationary distribution for M and
with probability 1, the time average for f : I → R converges to the vJ
expected value regardless of the initial position.
Suppose X and Y play Markov plans leading to the 4× 4 matrix M
of (2.7) and vJ is the stationary distribution for a terminal set J ⊂
{cc, cd, dc, dd}. If the sequence of outcomes enters J , then it remains
in J and with probability 1 the average payoff (sNX , s
N
Y ) converges with
(2.8) lim
N→∞
(sNX , s
N
Y ) = v1(R,R) + v2(S, T ) + v3(T, S) + v4(P, P ),
where vJ = (v1, v2, v3, v4).
If there is more than one terminal set J , then with probability 1
the sequence will enter some terminal set J with the probabilities for
different J ’s depending upon the initial plays.
For example, suppose that p satisfies 0 < pi < 1 for i = 1, . . . , 4 and
that q satisfies the analogous condition. Every entry of the associated
Markov matrix M is positive and {cc, cd, dc, dd} is the unique terminal
set. So there is a unique stationary distribution v with vi > 0 for
i = 1, . . . , 4 and with probability one the outcome sequence passes
repeatedly through each of the four outcomes with the average payoff
sequence converging according to (2.8).
Smale in [18] aggregates the data in a different way. He suggest using
as data the current average payoff given by (2.4). A Smale plan is a
function pi : S→ [0, 1]. If X uses the Smale plan pi then in round N + 1
he plays c with probability pi(sNX , s
N
Y ). Again we have the switch due to
reverse in labeling for the other player. Let Switch : S→ S be defined
by Switch(sX , sY ) = (sY , sX). If Y uses the Smale plan pi then she
cooperates with probability pi ◦ Switch(sNX , sNY ) = pi(sNY , sNX). That is,
Y responds to s ∈ S by using pi ◦ Switch applied to s.
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So if X uses piX and Y uses piY then the outcomes cc, cd, dc, dd at
time N + 1 have probabilities given by
pcc = piX(s
N) · piY (Switch(sN)),
pcd = piX(s
N) · (1− piY (Switch(sN))),
pdc = (1− piX(sN)) · piY (Switch(sN)),
pdd = (1− piX(sN)) · (1− piY (Switch(sN))).
(2.9)
After the randomization is applied, we obtain the time N + 1 payoff
SN+1 = (SN+1X , S
N+1
Y ).
Smale only uses pure strategy responses for which pi maps to {0, 1}.
For the most part we will follow him. We will call pi−1(1) ⊂ S the
cooperation zone for pi and pi−1(0) ⊂ S the defection zone.
The following Separation Theorems will be used repeatedly.
Lemma 2.3. Let L : R2 → R be a nonconstant affine map, i.e.
L(x, y) = ax + by + c with (a, b) 6= (0, 0). Let M be the maximum
value of |L| on S. X and Y use general strategies.
If there exists a time N∗ so that for all N ≥ N∗, L(sN) > 0 implies
L(SN+1) ≤ 0, then for N ≥ N∗
(2.10) L(sN) ≤ MN
∗
N
.
So lim supN→∞ L(s
N) ≤ 0.
Proof: Since an affine map commutes with convex combinations,
(2.5) implies
(2.11) L(sN+1) =
N
N + 1
L(sN) +
1
N + 1
L(SN+1).
So if N ≥ N∗
(2.12) L(sN) > 0 =⇒ L(sN+1) ≤ N
N + 1
L(sN).
On the other hand, since N∗ ≥ 1
(2.13) L(sN) ≤ 0 =⇒ L(sN+1) ≤ 1
N + 1
L(SN+1) ≤ MN
∗
N + 1
.
Finally, observe that L(sN
∗
) ≤ MN∗
N∗ . So inequality (2.10) follows from
(2.12) and (2.13) by mathematical induction.
2
Lemma 2.4. Let L : R2 → R be a nonconstant affine map. X and Y
use general strategies.
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(a) If L(P, P ), L(T, S) < 0, then there is a positive integer k such
that for all N there exists n with N ≤ n ≤ kN such that either L(sn) <
0 or X plays c on round n.
(b) If L(R,R), L(S, T ) > 0, then there is a positive integer k such
that for all N there exists n with N ≤ n ≤ kN such that either L(sn) >
0 or X plays d on round n.
Proof: (a) Let m = min{−L(P, P ),−L(T, S)} and let k be an in-
teger with k ≥ 2 such that M
k−1 < m. Assume X plays d in rounds
N, . . . , kN then in each round the outcome is either dc or dd and so
L(Sn) ≤ −m for n = N + 1, . . . , kN . On the other hand, L(Sn) ≤ M
for n = 1, . . . , N . Hence
(2.14) L(skN) =
1
kN
ΣkNt=1L(S
t) ≤ 1
kN
(NM − (k − 1)Nm) < 0.
The proof of (b) is completely analogous.
2
Theorem 2.5. Let L : R2 → R be a nonconstant affine map with M
be the maximum value of |L| on S. Player X uses a Smale plan pi from
round N∗ on and player Y uses an arbitrary plan and X and Y use
arbitrary initial plays.
(a) Assume that L(s) > 0 implies pi(s) = 0, i.e. {L > 0} is contained
in the defection zone of pi.
(i) If L(P, P ), L(T, S) ≤ 0 then for all N ≥ N∗.
(2.15) L(sN) ≤ MN
∗
N
.
So lim supN→∞ L(s
N) ≤ 0.
(ii) If L(P, P ), L(T, S) < 0 then there is a positive integer k so that
for all N ≥ N∗ there exists n with N ≤ n ≤ kN such that
L(sn) ≤ 0.
(iii) If L(R,R), L(S, T ) > 0 then there is a positive integer k so that
for all N ≥ N∗ there exists n with N ≤ n ≤ kN such that X
plays d on round n.
(b) Assume that L(s) < 0 implies pi(s) = 1 i.e. {L < 0} is contained
in the cooperation zone of pi.
(i) If L(R,R), L(S, T ) ≥ 0 then for all N ≥ N∗.
(2.16) L(sN) ≥ −MN
∗
N
.
So lim infN→∞ L(sN) ≥ 0.
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(ii) If L(R,R), L(S, T ) > 0 then there is a positive integer k so that
for all N ≥ N∗ there exists n with N ≤ n ≤ kN such that
L(sn) ≥ 0.
(iii) If L(P, P ), L(T, S) > 0 then there is a positive integer k so that
for all N ≥ N∗ there exists n with N ≤ n ≤ kN such that X
plays c on round n.
Proof: (a)(i) If L(sN) > 0 then X plays d and so the N+1 outcome
is either dc or dd. Hence, SN+1 is either (T, S) or (P, P ) which implies
L(SN+1) ≤ 0. So we can apply Lemma 2.3 to get (2.15).
(a)(ii) Apply Lemma 2.4(b) to obtain k so that for some n between
N and kN either L(sn) < 0 or X plays c on round n. By assumption,
if X plays c on round n then L(sn) ≤ 0.
(a)(iii) Apply Lemma 2.4(a) to obtain k so that for some n between
N and kN either L(sn) > 0 or X plays d on round n. If L(sn) > 0 then
X plays d on round n.
The proof of (b) is completely analogous to that of (a) applying
Lemma 2.3 to −L to get (2.16).
2
We will say that a player eventually uses a plan when there exists
N∗ so that the plan is used for all N ≥ N∗.
Notation: For distinct points A,B ∈ R2 we will use [A,B] for the
closed segment connecting the points, [A,B) for the half-open segment
[A,B] \ B, etc. We will denote by )A,B( the line through A and
B and use [A,B( for the ray from A through B. In general, for a
finite set of points {A1, . . . , An} we will use [A1, . . . , An] for the convex
hull. We will call the line )(P, P ), (R,R)( the diagonal and the line
)(S, T ), (T, S)( the co-diagonal. If `1 and `2 are non-parallel lines, then
we will let `1∩ `2 denote the point of intersection, abusively identifying
the singleton set with the point contained therein.
Any line ` in R2 is the intersection of two half-planes H+ and H−.
When the line is not vertical we will use H+ for the upper half-plane.
We will then refer to H+\` as the set of points above `, with H−\` the
points below `. Up to multiplication by a positive constant an affine
map L : R2 → R is uniquely defined by the conditions that L is zero
on ` and is positive on H+ \ `. We will say that L is associated with `
and vice-versa.
A line ` is called a separation line for the game when (S, T ) and
(R,R) lie in one half-plane while (P, P ) and (T, S) lie in the other.
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A separation line intersects the segments [(S, T ), (P, P )] and
[(R,R), (T, S)] and so is determined by a choice of a point on each of
these segments. Any point on [(S, T ), (P, P )] may be used. If P ≤
1
2
(T + S) then any point on [(R,R), (T, S)] may be used. However, if
P > 1
2
(T +S) then the line )(S, T ), (P, P )( intersects the open segment
((R,R), (T, S)) at a point we will label W¯ . The point W¯ is on or below
any separation line. In general, a separation line has slope m with
|m| ≤ 1, with m = 1 only for the diagonal line and with m = −1 only
for the co-diagonal. The co-diagonal is a separation line only when
P ≤ 1
2
(T + S).
A separation line cannot be vertical, so (S, T ), (R,R) ∈ H+ and
(P, P ), (T, S) ∈ H−. Hence, for an associated affine map L,
(2.17) L(R,R), L(S, T ) ≥ 0 ≥ L(P, P ), L(T, S).
Corollary 2.6. Assume that eventually X plays a Smale plan pi, Y
uses an arbitrary plan and that the initial play is arbitrary. Let Ω be
the limit point set of an associated sequence of outcomes. Let C ⊂ S
be a closed, convex set and ` be a separation line.
(a) If (P, P ), (T, S) ∈ C and S \C is contained in the defection zone
pi−1(0), then Ω ⊂ C.
(b) If (R,R), (S, T ) ∈ C and S \ C is contained in the cooperation
zone pi−1(1), then Ω ⊂ C.
(c) If S∩ ` ⊂ C and pi(s) = 0 for s above C and pi(s) = 1 for s below
C, then Ω ⊂ C.
Proof: (a): For s ∈ S \ C, let s′ be the closest point in C. The line
` through s′ which is perpendicular to )s, s′( is a line of support for C.
That is, if L is an affine function associated with ` such that L(s) > 0
then L ≤ 0 on C. From Theorem 2.5 (a)(i) it follows that L ≤ 0 on Ω.
In particular, s 6∈ Ω.
(b): Proceed as above, using Theorem 2.5 (b)(i), instead.
(c): Let C+ consist of the points of S on or above C and C− consist
of the points of S on or below C. To be precise, if H± are the half-
spaces associated with `, C± = C ∪ (H± ∩ S). These are each closed,
convex sets. Because ` is a separation line, (P, P ), (T, S) ∈ C− and
(R,R), (S, T ) ∈ C+. From (a) it follows that Ω ⊂ C− and from (b)
that Ω ⊂ C+. Thus, Ω ⊂ C− ∩ C+ = C.
2
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Definition 2.7. The map pi : S → [0, 1] is a simple Smale plan with
separation line ` if for an associated affine function L for `
(2.18) pi(s) =
{
0 if L(s) > 0,
1 if L(s) < 0.
That is, the pi player responds with d if s is above the line ` and with
c if s is below the line. We do not specify the value of pi on the line.
Corollary 2.8. Assume that from some round N∗ on, player X uses a
simple Smale plan with separation line ` and associated affine function
L. Let M be the maximum of |L| on S. Assume that player Y uses an
arbitrary plan and that the initial plays are arbitrary.
For all N ≥ N∗
(2.19) |L(sN)| ≤ MN
∗
N
.
So limN→∞ L(sN) = 0 and the limit point set Ω is contained in `.
Proof: Clearly, (2.19) follows from (2.15) and (2.16), given (2.17)
and (2.18).
2
Thus, if eventually X plays a simple Smale plan and player Y uses an
arbitrary plan, then after the randomization for mixed strategies has
been applied, a sequence of outcomes is obtained and the limit point
set Ω of the corresponding payoff sequence {sN} is a point or closed
segment in the separation line ` by Proposition 2.1.
The plan All-C, which always cooperates, and so has pi = 1 on S,
is a simple Smale plan with separation line )(R,R), (S, T )(. If P ≤
1
2
(T +S) then All-D, which always defects, and so has pi = 0 on S, is a
simple Smale plan with with separation line )(P, P ), (T, S)(. However,
if P > 1
2
(T + S) then every simple Smale plan cooperates below the
line )(P, P ), (T, S)( and so, in particular, has pi = 1 on a neighborhood
of 1
2
(T + S, T + S).
If P ≤ E ≤ R then the horizontal line {sY = E} is a separation line.
The associated simple Smale plan is the Smale version of an equalizer
plan introduced in [9] and also described by Press and Dyson [15]. If X
uses this equalizer plan then the limiting payoff for Y is E regardless of
Y’s play. On the other hand, the payoff to X can be anything between
R and P, or even lower.
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If, eventually, X and Y play simple Smale plans piX and piY with
separation lines `X and `Y , respectively, then Y responds with piY ◦
Switch and so the set Ω of limiting payoffs lies on the intersection
`X ∩ Switch(`Y ). Except for the extreme cases with `X = `Y =
Switch(`Y ) equal to the diagonal or `X = `Y = Switch(`Y ) equal
to the co-diagonal the intersection is a single point and so the payoff
sequence {sN} converges to the intersection point `X ∩ Switch(`Y ).
Proposition 2.9. (a) If, eventually, X plays the plan All-C then for
any strategy for Y and any initial plays, the limit point set Ω is con-
tained in the segment [(R,R), (S, T )].
(b) If, eventually, X plays the plan All-D then for any strategy for Y
and any initial plays, the limit point set Ω is contained in the segment
[(P, P ), (T, S)].
Proof: (a) Since All-C is a simple Smale plan with separation line
`1 = )(R,R), (S, T )( the limit point set lies in `1∩S = [(R,R), (S, T )].
The result also follows from Corollary 2.6 (b) with C = [(R,R), (S, T )]
(b) If P ≤ 1
2
(T+S) then All-D is a simple Smale plan with separation
line `2 = )(P, P ), (T, S)( and we can proceed as in (a). If P >
1
2
(T+S),
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All-D is not a simple Smale plan. The result nonetheless follows from
Corollary 2.6 (a) with C = [(P, P ), (T, S)].
2
Corollary 2.10. Assume that, eventually, X uses a Smale plan pi. Let
Y use an arbitrary strategy and let X and Y use arbitrary initial plays.
If Ω is the limit point set, then Ω is not contained in the S interior
of pi−1(1) \ [(R,R), (S, T )] and Ω is not contained in the S interior of
pi−1(0) \ [(P, P ), (T, S)].
Proof: Assume X uses pi from some time N∗1 . Let U denote the
interior of pi−1(1) \ [(R,R), (S, T )]. If Ω ⊂ U then by Proposition
2.1 there exists N∗ ≥ N∗1 such that sN ∈ U for all N ≥ N∗. This
implies that for every round beyond N∗, X plays c. So the sequence of
payoffs is the same as though X plays All-C starting from round N∗.
So by Proposition 2.9 (a) the limit point set would be contained in
[(R,R), (S, T )]. This contradiction shows that Ω ⊂ U is impossible.
The second assertion similarly follows from Proposition 2.9 (b).
2
3. Good Plans
We describe informally the conditions that we would like a good plan
to satisfy.
• (Cooperation Condition) If the players X and Y use fixed
good strategies, i.e. good plans together with initial coopera-
tion, then for every N , SN = (R,R) and so, of course, the
time averages sN = (R,R) for all N as well.
• (Protection Condition) If X eventually plays a fixed good
plan, and s∗ = (s∗X , s
∗
Y ) is a limit point for the sequence {sN}
with arbitrary initial play and with Y using any plan, then
(3.1) s∗Y ≥ R =⇒ s∗X = s∗Y = R.
• (Robustness Condition) If eventually the players X and Y
use fixed good plans, then regardless of the earlier play
limN→∞ sN = (R,R) at least with probability one.
A Markov plan is called agreeable if the response to a cc outcome is
always c. That is, p satisfies p1 = pcc = 1. A Markov plan is called
firm if the response to a dd outcome is always d. That is, p satisfies
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p4 = pdd = 0. For example, the TFT plan with p = (1, 0, 1, 0) is both
agreeable and firm.
If both X and Y use Markov plans then {cc} is a terminal set if and
only if both plans are agreeable.
We call a general plan is weakly agreeable if the response is c when
every previous outcome is cc. A general plan is called weakly firm if the
response is d when every previous outcome is dd. For example, a Smale
plan pi is weakly agreeable if and only if pi(R,R) = 1 and is weakly firm
if and only if pi(P, P ) = 0. Clearly, a Markov plan is weakly agreeable
if and only if it is agreeable and is weakly firm if and only if it is firm.
If X and Y both use weakly agreeable plans and initially cooperate
then every outcome is cc and sN = (R,R) for all N .
So to obtain the Cooperation Condition we demand that a good plan
be weakly agreeable.
The agreeable Markov plans which satisfy the Protection Condition
can be completely characterized.
Theorem 3.1. Let p = (p1, p2, p3, p4) be an agreeable Markov plan so
that p1 = 1.
The plan p satisfies the Protection Condition if and only if the fol-
lowing inequalities hold.
(3.2)
T −R
R− S · p3 < (1− p2) and
T −R
R− P · p4 < (1− p2).
Proof: See [5] Theorem 1.5, where a plan is called good if it is
agreeable and satisfies the Protection Condition. See also [3].
2
Remark: Note that (3.2) implies p2 < 1.
For a Markov plan p we will refer to (3.2), together with the as-
sumption p1 = 1, as the protection inequalities. Thus, a Markov plan is
agreeable and satisfies the Protection Condition exactly when the the
protection inequalities hold.
For Smale plans we have
Theorem 3.2. Let ` be a separation line with associated affine function
L such that
(3.3) L(R,R) = 0, and L(P,R) > 0.
That is, ` is a line through (R,R) with slope m satisfying 0 < m ≤ 1.
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Let pi : S → [0, 1] be a Smale plan. If L(s) > 0 implies pi(s) = 0,
i.e. {L > 0} is contained in the defection zone, then pi satisfies the
Protection Condition.
In particular, if pi is a simple Smale plan with separation line ` then
pi satisfies the Protection Condition.
Proof: The line ` contains (R,R), and the point (P,R) lies above `.
Since ` is a separation line, it follows that s = (R,R) is the only point
of S ∩H− with sY ≥ R. By Theorem 2.5 (a) L(s∗X , s∗Y ) ≤ 0 for every
limit point s∗, i.e. Ω ⊂ S ∩H−.
Hence, (R,R) is the only possible limit point s∗ with s∗Y ≥ R.
2
If ` is a line through (R,R) with slope m satisfying 0 < m ≤ 1 then
` is a separation line. and we call such a line ` a protection line for pi
if pi = 0 above the line. The above result says exactly that if a Smale
plan admits a protection line then it satisfies the Protection Condition.
Definition 3.3. A Markov plan p = (p1, p2, p3, p4) is generous when
(3.4) p1 = 1, 1 > p2 > 0, p4 > 0.
That is, a generous plan is agreeable and with positive probability
responds to an opponent’s defection with cooperation, but does not
always cooperate from a cd outcome (which had payoff (S, T )).
Theorem 3.4. Assume that X and Y, eventually, play Markov plans
p and q respectively. If both plans are generous then {cc} is the only
terminal set for the associated Markov chain. So from any initial play,
with probability one, eventually the outcome sequence is constant at cc
and so limN→∞ sN = (R,R).
Proof: Since the two plans are agreeable, {cc} is a terminal set.
Since p4, q4 > 0, there is a positive probability of moving from dd to cc
and so dd is a transient state. From cd, 1 > p2 > 0 implies that X plays
either c or d with positive probability. If Y plays c (or d) with positive
probability then from cd there is a positive probability of moving to cc
(resp.to dd and thence to cc). Hence, cd is transient. Recall that Y
uses the response vector (q1, q3, q2, q4) and so cooperates after dc with
probability q2. Thus, a symmetric argument shows that dc is transient.
If the players use p and q from time N∗ on then from that point,
the play follows the Markov chain given by M and so with probability
one the sequence of outcomes eventually arrives at the unique terminal
set {cc}.
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2
Definition 3.5. A Smale plan pi : S → [0, 1] is generous if pi(s) = 1
when sX ≥ sY and there exists an open subset U of S which contains
the half-open segment [1
2
(T + S, T + S), (R,R)) such that pi(s) = 1 for
s ∈ U . That is, the cooperation zone contains U and the points on and
below the diagonal line.
The following is essentially a part of [18] Theorem 1.
Theorem 3.6. Assume that, eventually, X and Y play Smale plans piX
and piY , respectively. If both plans are generous then from any initial
state in S, limN→∞ (sNX , s
N
Y ) = (R,R).
Proof: Assume that both plans are adopted by time N∗. Let
L0(s) = sY − sX . That is, L0 is the affine function associated with
the diagonal separation line. Let L1(s) = sX + sY − T − S. That is,
L1 is the affine function associated with the co-diagonal. Notice that
the maximum value of L1 on S is L1(R,R) = 2R − T − S and that
L1 < L1(R,R) on S \ {(R,R)}.
Since L0(s) < 0 implies piX(s) = 1 and piY (s) = 1, we can apply
Theorem 2.5 (b) to L0 and piX to get L0(s
N) ≥ −M0N∗/N , where
M0 = T − S is the maximum value of |L0| on S. The Y player uses
piY ◦Switch and so we apply the theorem to L0◦Switch and piY ◦Switch
to get −L0(sN) = L0 ◦ Switch(sN) ≥ −M0N∗/N . Hence,
(3.5) |L0(sN)| ≤ M0N∗/N.
Thus, the limit point set Ω is contained in the diagonal.
Observe that everywhere in S either X or Y plays c and so the only
outcomes are cd, dc and cc. Hence, we have L1(S
N) ≥ 0 for all N . We
can apply Lemma 2.3 with L = −L1 to get L1(sN) ≥ −M1N∗N for all
N ≥ N∗, where M1 is the maximum value of |L1| on S. Hence, on Ω,
L1 ≥ 0. Notice that in the case when P ≥ (T + S)/2, L1 ≥ 0 on all of
S.
Thus, Ω ⊂ [1
2
(T + S, T + S), (R,R)].
Let U = UX ∩ Switch(UY ) where UX and UY are the open sets
containing the half-open interval [1
2
(T + S, T + S), (R,R)) on which
piX = 1 and piY = 1, respectively. By assumption, if s
N ∈ U then both
players play c with outcome cc at time N + 1. So SN+1 = (R,R).
For  > 0, {L1 > L1(R,R) − } is a neighborhood of (R,R) and so
U ∪{L1 > L1(R,R)− } is a neighborhood of [12(T +S, T +S), (R,R)]
and so of Ω. From Proposition 2.1 it follows that there exists N ≥ N∗
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so that N ≥ N implies sN ∈ U ∪ {L1 > L1(R,R) − }. Hence, for
N ≥ N, L1(sN)−L1(R,R)+  ≤ 0 implies sN ∈ U and so L1(SN+1) =
L1(R,R) and so L1(S
N+1)−L1(R,R) +  =  > 0. We can again apply
Lemma 2.3 this time to L = −(L1 − L1(R,R) + ) to get
(3.6) N ≥ N =⇒ L1(sN) ≥ L1(R,R)− − (M + )N
N
,
where M is the maximum of |L1 −L1(R,R)| on S. Hence, there exists
N ′ ≥ N so that
(3.7) N ≥ N ′ =⇒ L1(sN) ≥ L1(R,R)− 2.
Thus, limN→∞ L1(sN) = L1(R,R).
Since, (R,R) is the unique maximum point for L1, it follows that
limN→∞ sN = (R,R).
2
It would be nice to show that if X plays a generous Smale plan and Y
plays a generous Markov plan, then with probability one limN→∞ sN =
(R,R). I don’t know if the conjecture is true in full generality. However,
we get the result we want if we strengthen the assumption.
Definition 3.7. A Smale plan pi is convex-generous if pi : S→ {0, 1},i.e
no mixed strategy responses, and the cooperation zone pi−1(1) is a closed
convex set C such that
(i) (P, P ), (R,R), (T, S) ∈ C.
(ii) (S, T ) 6∈ C.
(iii) 1
2
(T +S, T +S) ∈ C◦ where C◦ is the interior of C with respect
to S.
By (i) and (iii), there exists t∗ ∈ (1
2
, 1) such that (1 − t)(T, S) +
t(S, T ) ∈ C if and only if 0 ≤ t ≤ t∗. Let V denote the point (1 −
t∗)(T, S) + t∗(S, T ).
Let P¯ = min(P, 1
2
(T + S)). Thus, the diagonal line intersects S in
the segment [(R,R), (P¯ , P¯ )] and (P¯ , P¯ ) ∈ C, by (i) and (iii). Hence,
the convex hull of [V, (P¯ , P¯ ), (R,R), (T, S)] is contained in C. This
contains (sX , sY ) if sX ≥ sY . Furthermore, its S interior contains
[(1
2
(T + S, T + S), (R,R)) and so, as expected, pi is generous.
Theorem 3.8. Assume X eventually plays a convex-generous Smale
plan and Y plays a generous Markov plan. With probability one there
is a time after which both players play c and so limN→∞ sN = (R,R).
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Proof: Let X play pi with convex set C = pi−1(1) and let Y use
q = (q1, q2, q3, q4) with q1 = 1 and  < q2,  < q4 for some  > 0. Recall
that for Y, q2 is the probability of cooperating in a round following the
outcome dc.
Claim 1: With probability one, for every N there exists n ≥ N
such that sn ∈ C.
Proof: It suffices to show that for every N the event
EN = {sn ∈ S \ C : for all n ≥ N}
has probability zero.
Let `1 = )V, (R,R)(, which is a separation line, and let L1 be an
affine function associated with `1. Clearly, (P, P ) and (T, S) lie below
the line and so L1(P, P ), L1(T, S) < 0. By Lemma 2.4 (a) there exists
a positive constant k1 (which depends only on L1) such that for some
N1 between N and k1N either L1(s
N1) < 0 or X plays c on round N1.
Note that the latter is equivalent to sN1 ∈ C.
Case 1 [P ≥ 1
2
(T + S)]: The point V lies on the side [(S, T ), (T, S)]
of the triangle S. Thus, every point of S on or below ` lies in C. Hence,
L1(s) ≤ 0 implies s ∈ C and so sN1 ∈ C in any case.
Case 2 [P < 1
2
(T + S)]: The line `1 intersects the open segment
((P, P ), (S, T )) in a point V ′. Let ∆ denote the triangle [(P, P ), V ′, V ]
and ∆′ = ∆ \ C. Observe that C ∪∆′ contains the set {L1 ≤ 0} ∩ S.
Assuming EN , s
N1 lies in ∆′ since it is not in C. For n ≥ N if sn ∈ ∆′
then, since it is not in C, the payoff Sn+1 is either (P, P ) or (T, S) and
so by (2.5) L1(s
n+1) ≤ n
n+1
L1(s
n) ≤ 0. Since sn+1 6∈ C, it follows that
sn+1 ∈ ∆′. Inductively, we have sn ∈ ∆′ for all n ≥ N1 and so for all
n ≥ k1N .
Now if among the rounds k1N, · · · ,M − 1 Y plays c exactly r times
then
(3.8) sk1N+M =
k1Ns
k1N + (M − r)(P, P ) + r(T, S)
k1N + M
,
and so the vector from (P, P ) to sk1N+M is the nonzero vector
(3.9) sk1N+M − (P, P ) = k1N [s
k1N − (P, P )] + r[(T, S)− (P, P )]
k1N + M
,
Normalize these vectors to obtain [sk1N+M − (P, P )]1 of length 1.
Suppose that as M →∞ the number r of c plays by Y is unbounded.
Then, as M → ∞ these unit vectors have [(T, S)− (P, P )]1 as a limit
point. On the other hand, the closed set of vectors
{[s − (P, P )]1 : s ∈ ∆ \ {(P, P )}} = {[s − (P, P )]1 : s ∈ [V, V ′]} does
not contain [(T, S)− (P, P )]1.
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It follows that, assuming EN , there exists R <∞ such that Y plays
c at most R times and so from some N2 onward Y always plays d. For
each N2 ≥ k1N the event EN,N2 = EN and Y plays d on every round
n with n ≥ N2 has probability zero because at each such round Y is
responding to dd by playing d. These are independent events each with
probability at most 1 − . So EN =
⋃
N2≥k1N EN,N2 has probability
zero.
This completes the proof of Claim 1.
If Y plays c at any time N when sN ∈ C then the outcome of the
N+1 round is cc with payoff (R,R). Since C is convex sN+1 ∈ C and so
X next plays C and Y next plays C because q is agreeable. Inductively
cc is the outcome and sn ∈ C for every round n with n ≥ N . Let E0
denote the event Y plays d whenever sn ∈ C and E˜ = E0 \
⋃
N{EN}.
From Claim 1, it suffices to show that E˜ has probability zero.
Claim 2: Assuming E˜, for every N there exists n ≥ N such that
sn ∈ S \ C.
Proof: If we assume E0, then whenever X plays c, Y plays d leading
to payoff (S, T ). If for some N , sn ∈ C for all n ≥ N and E0 is true,
then for all n > N we have Sn = (S, T ) and the sequence {sn} would
converge to (S, T ), but the complement of C is a neighborhood of (S, T )
and so eventually sn 6∈ C. The contradiction proves Claim 2.
Assuming E˜, sn ∈ C and sn ∈ S \ C each occur infinitely often by
Claim 1 and Claim 2.
Now let Nk be the k
th return time to C from X \ C. This is an
infinite sequence of Markov times. Since at time Nk − 1 the payoff
sequence was in S \ C, X played d and so at time Nk Y plays d in
response to either a dc or a dd. Playing d in these cases has probability
at most 1 − . Furthermore, the Y play at time Nk is independent
of the previous plays. Thus, again E˜ requires an infinite sequence of
independent events, each with probability at most 1− . Hence, E˜ has
probability zero.
2
Remark: Our assumptions on q allow the possibility q3 = 0. So if
(S, T ) were in C◦ then from a neighborhood of (S, T ) it would be a limit
point following an infinite sequence of cd outcomes. Notice that the
assumption (S, T ) 6∈ C is analogous to the assumption that p2 < 1 for
a generous Markov plan. If p2 = 1, p3 = 0 and q satisfies the analogous
condition then {cd} and {dc} are terminal sets when X plays p and Y
plays q.
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Definition 3.9. We call a Markov plan good when it satisfies the
protection inequalities (and so is agreeable) and is generous.
We call a Smale plan good (or convex-good) when it is weakly agree-
able, admits a protection line and is generous (resp. and is convex-
generous).
For example, if pi is a simple Smale plan with separation line ` then
pi is good if and only if it is weakly agreeable (i.e. pi(R,R) = 1) and
` is a line through (R,R) with slope strictly between 0 and 1, so that
` is a protection line. It is convex-good if and only if, in addition,
pi = 1 on `∩ S. Such a good simple Smale plan is the Smale version of
what is called in [10] a complier strategy (also called a generous zero-
determinant strategy, as in e.g. [20]). Any limit point s∗, other than
(R,R) on the separation line ` has s∗Y larger than s
∗
X , albeit less than
R.
On the other hand, if ` is a line through (P, P ) with slope between 0
and 1 then it is a separation line and the associated simple Smale plan
is, when P ≤ 1
2
(T + S), the Smale version of what Press and Dyson
[15] call an extortionate strategy. Any limit point s∗, other than (P, P )
on the separation line ` satisfies s∗Y < s
∗
X . Thus, if Y plays to avoid the
(P, P ) payoff she always obtains less than X does from the change in
policy. The best reply to such an extortionate strategy is All-C. The
payoff point is then the intersection point B = `∩ ((R,R), (T, S)) with
P < BY < R < BX .
In [5] a Markov plan, there called a memory-one plan, is called
good when it satisfies the protection inequalities, or, equivalently, it is
agreeable and satisfies the Protection Condition. The TFT plan with
p = (1, 0, 1, 0) satisfies the protection inequalities but is firm rather
than generous. If both X and Y use the TFT plan then from initial
outcome cc the sequence of outcomes is fixed at cc, but from an initial
dd, the state dd is fixed. Following cd or dc the two states alternate
leading to convergence of the payoff sequence to 1
2
(T + S, T + S). The
phenomena illustrate the failure of robustness in the absence of gen-
erosity.
In [18] a Smale plan pi is called good if it is generous, and so satisfies
the Robustness Condition, and pi(s) = 0 when sY > R. The line
{sY = R} is an equalizer line and so Smale’s conditions allows the
possibility of a limit outcome (sX , R) with sX < R.
In addition, Smale imposed the condition that pi(s) = 0 when sX <
P . If P > 1
2
(T + S), this would contradict the condition that pi = 1
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when sX > sY . Smale was only considering the case with P <
1
2
(T +S)
and we will examine that situation first.
Assume P < 1
2
(T + S). Choose `1 a line through (R,R) with slope
strictly between 0 and 1, so that the weakly agreeable simple Smale
plan with separation line `1 is good. Let A be the point of intersection
of `1 and the open segment ((P, P ), (S, T )). Choose a point V on the
open segment ((R,R), A) with VX ≥ P or larger. Let `2 be the line
)(P, P ), V (. Let pi be a Smale plan such that pi(s) = 0 if s is above `1
or above `2 and pi(s) = 1 at (R,R), below the diagonal and on some
open set containing [1
2
(T + S, T + S), (R,R)). Thus, pi is generous and
since `1 is a protection line it is a good Smale strategy. It follows from
Corollary 2.6(c) that if X eventually plays pi against any plan for Y and
any initial plays, then the limit point set Ω is contained in the triangle
[(P, P ), (R,R), V ].
The advantage of such a plan is that it excludes points above `2 from
the limit. In contrast, against the good simple Smale strategy with
separation line `1, any point of [A, (R,R)] can occur as the limit if Y
plays a suitable simple Smale strategy. For example, recall that All-D
is a simple Smale strategy with separation line ` = )(P, P ), (T, S)(.
Thus, if Y plays All-D then the limit point is the intersection point of
`1 with Switch(`) which is A with AY > P > AX .
This sort of possible cost can always occur with a generous Markov
plan p. If Y plays All-D, which is a Markov plan with q = (0, 0, 0, 0),
then the unique terminal set is {cd, dd} with stationary distribution
v = (0, p4, 0, (1 − p2))/[p4 + (1 − p2)]. The limiting average payoff
(s∗X , s
∗
Y ) given by (2.8) satisfies (s
∗
X , s
∗
Y ) − (P, P ) = (S − P, T − P )
with  = p4/[p4 + (1− p2)] > 0. So s∗Y > P > s∗X .
On the other hand, for plans such as pi above we have seen that the
limit point set Ω against any Y play is a connected set contained in the
triangle [(P, P ), V, (R,R)].
However:
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Example 3.10. The limit set Ω need not be a point or interval and it
may contain points in the interior of the triangle.
Assume P < 1
2
(T + S). Choose V ∈ S with R > VY > VX ≥ P .
Let `1 = )(R,R), V ( and `2 = )(P, P ), V (. Let piX be a Smale
plan with piX(s) = 0 for above `1 or above `2 and piX(s) = 1 oth-
erwise. In that case, piX is convex-good with C the quadrilateral
[(P, P ), V, (R,R), (T, S)]. Let C ′ ⊂ C denote the triangle [(P, P ), V,
(R,R)]. As we saw above, when X plays piX against any strategy for
Y, the limit point set Ω is contained in C ′. Furthermore, by Corollary
2.10 Ω must intersect [(P, P ), V ] ∪ [V, (R,R)].
Choose a point V ′ on the half-open segment [V, (R,R)) and a point
W on )(S, T ), V ′( between the lines `1 and the diagonal. Let ` =
)(R,R),W ( so that the line ` lies between `1 and the diagonal, with all
three intersecting at (R,R). Let `′ = )(S, T ),W ( = )(S, T ), V ′(.
Label the following points:
• `1 ∩ )(P, P ), (S, T )( = A.
• `2 ∩ )(R,R), (S, T )( = B.
• `′ ∩ )(P, P ), (R,R)( = (Q,Q) and `′ ∩ `1 = V ′.
• ` ∩ `2 = W ′ and ` ∩ )(P, P ), (S, T )( = W ′′.
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Let C¯ be the quadrilateral [(P, P ), (Q,Q),W,W ′′]. Define piY for Y
to be the Smale plan with piY (s) = 1 if s lies in Switch(C¯) and = 0
otherwise. Recall that Y responds with piY ◦ Switch and so Y plays c
if s ∈ C¯ and plays d otherwise.
We prove that if, eventually, X plays piX and Y plays piY then re-
gardless of the initial play, the limit point set Ω is the boundary of the
quadrilateral Lˆ = [V,W ′,W, V ′] (If V ′ = V, Ω is the boundary of the
triangle [V,W ′,W ]).
Proof: Assume that X and Y play piX and piY , respectively, beyond
time N∗.
The lines `1, `2, `, `
′ and the diagonal subdivide S into twelve polyhe-
dral regions. For any  > 0, let N > N
∗ be an  step-time after which
every move from sN to sN+1 has distance less than , i.e. let N be
greater than max(N∗,
√
2(T − S)/). Let 0 > 0 be smaller than the
distance between any two non-intersecting regions and let N0 = N0 .
Thus, such a small move cannot jump between non-intersecting regions.
Let C˜ = C¯ ∩ C, which is the quadrilateral [(P, P ),W ′,W, (Q,Q)].
Claim: For every N ≥ N∗ there exists n ≥ N such that sn ∈ C˜.
First we show that the sequence of payoffs must enter C¯. If not, then
for every round beyond N , Y plays d. As in the proof of Proposition
2.10 the results after N are the same as though Y plays All-D which is a
simple Smale plan with separation line )(P, P ), (T, S)(. Then Ω is con-
tained in the intersection of the triangle C ′ with Switch( )(P, P ), (T, S)( )
= )(P, P ), (S, T )(. This intersection contains only the point (P, P ). If
Ω were just (P, P ) then for any small neighborhood U of (P, P ) even-
tually sn ∈ U . If sn is on or above the diagonal then sn ∈ C¯. If sn is
below the diagonal then the sequence of payoffs moves toward (S, T )
and eventually makes a small jump into C¯. Either way, this contradicts
the assumption that the sequence never enters C¯.
Now for Z on the open segment ((P, P ),W ′) let UZ consist of the
points of S which are below both of the lines )(S, T ), Z( and )(T, S), Z(.
These are convex open neighborhoods of (P, P ) which converge to
(P, P ) as Z → (P, P ). Since (P, P ) ∈ C˜, if sn ∈ C¯ \ C˜ then there
exists Z such that sn 6∈ UZ , i.e. sn ∈ K1 = C¯ \ (C˜ ∪ UZ). Assume
n > N0. From such a point the sequence moves toward (T, S). During
the motion it remains above UZ . If the sequence does not enter C˜ from
C¯ \ C˜ then it jumps to below the diagonal to land in K2 the set of
points outside UZ which are on or below the diagonal and `
′. From
such points the sequence moves back toward (S, T ). If it jumps over
C˜ then it re-enters K1. This alternation cannot continue indefinitely.
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Notice that K1 and K2 are a positive distance Z apart. Once N ≥ NZ
the move from K1 or K2 must land in C˜.
This completes the proof of the Claim.
For any  > 0, let sn ∈ C˜ with n > N. From this point the sequence
moves toward (R,R) exiting C¯ at a point above, and  close to, the
line `′. The sequence now moves toward (S, T ),  close to and above
the line `′. It exits C at a point above `1 and  close to V ′. Now the
sequence moves toward (P, P ) entering Lˆ on or below, and  close to `1
and then moving back toward (S, T ). These PP and then ST alternate
motions may continue for a long time but it must eventually cease since
the sequence must eventually return to C˜. The exit occurs when the
sequence lands above `2,  close to V . The sequence then moves toward
(P, P ) above and  close to the line `2 until it enters C¯ \ C˜,  close to
W ′. The sequence then moves toward (T, S) crossing `2 close to W ′ to
re-enter C˜ now below and  close to the line `.
As N → ∞,  → 0 and the motion gets close to motion from W ′ to
W , from W to V ′, from V ′ to V , and then from V back to W .
2
Turning now to the case when P ≥ 1
2
(T + S) we see that the addi-
tional condition imposed by Smale now does not work so well.
Suppose you demand that pi satisfy pi(s) = 0 when sX ≤ 12(T + S)
or even just pi = 0 on the half-open segment (1
2
(T + S, T + S), (S, T )]
with pi = 1 on (1
2
(T +S, T +S), (T, S)]. If piX and piY both satisfy this
condition then for sN ∈ (1
2
(T + S, T + S), (S, T )] the payoff SN+1 =
(T, S) and for sN ∈ (1
2
(T +S, T +S), (T, S)] the payoff SN+1 = (S, T ).
Thus, the sequence remains on [(S, T ), (T, S)] moving back and forth as
the point 1
2
(T+S, T+S) is passed with limit point 1
2
(T+S, T+S), unless
the sequence lands exactly on the point 1
2
(T+S, T+S). If that happens
then, the result depends on the choices at the point 1
2
(T + S, T + S).
For most initial points, this cannot happen. For example, if the
initial point is an irrational mixture of (S, T ) and (T, S) then hitting
1
2
(T + S, T + S) does not occur. However, for actual play all outcomes
are rational mixture of the four points (S, T ), (T, S), (P, P ) and (R,R).
Focusing upon actual play leads to odd results.
Proposition 3.11. Suppose that pi(S, T ) = 0, pi(T, S) = 1 and pi(s) =
1 when s lies on the diagonal. If both X and Y play Smale plans which
satisfy these conditions then for any initial plays, lim sN = (R,R).
Proof: If the initial outcome is cc or dd then the initial payoff lies
on the diagonal and so every successive outcome is cc. If the initial
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outcome is cd, with payoff (S, T ) then the next outcome is dc with
payoff (T, S) so that s2 = 1
2
(T + S, T + S) which lies on the diagonal.
Hence, in any case, the outcome on the nth round is cc for n ≥ 3 and
the limit result follows.
2
This version of “robustness” is very unsatisfying. For real robustness
one wants approach to (R,R) even if errors occur in the computations
and if the plans are adopted only from some time N∗ on.
Example 3.12. Returning to the case with P > 1
2
(T + S) we describe
what seems to me to be the best version of robustness we can hope for
if we demand protection against payoffs below P .
Let ` be a protection line with slope less than 1 so that (P, P ) lies be-
low `. Let V ∈ ` with P ≤ VX < R, `1 = )(P, P ), V ( and `2 the vertical
line {sX = P}. Let W be the point of intersection `2 ∩ )(S, T ), (T, S)(.
Assume that piX(s) = 0 whenever s is above ` or `1, or if it is on or to
the left of `2. Otherwise, piX(s) = 1.
It follows from Corollary 2.6(a) and (b) that if X eventually plays
piX then against any Y play, the limit point set Ω is contained in
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the convex hull [W, (P, P ), V, (R,R)] = [W, (P, P ), V, (R,R), (T, S)] ∩
[W, (R,R), (S, T )].
Now assume that Y also eventually plays such a plan piY with lines
`′, `′1, `
′
2 = `2 and with points V
′ and W .
Let D consist of the set of points of S which are either on or below
)(P, P ), (S, T )( or on or below )(P, P ), (T, S)(. LetD1 = [W,Switch(W ),
(P, P )], the set of s ∈ S with sX , sY ≤ P . It is easy to check that if
sN
∗ ∈ D then sn ∈ D for all n ≥ N∗ and that for some N∗∗ ≥ N∗,
sN
∗∗ ∈ D1. All subsequent outcomes are dd and so lim sN = (P, P ). On
the other hand, if {sN} does not converge to (P, P ) then it is easy to
check that some sN
∗∗
lies in [(P, P ), V, (R,R), Switch(V ′)] \ {(P, P )}.
All subsequent outcomes are cc and so lim sN = (R,R). Thus, we
always have either convergence to (P, P ) or to (R,R).
2
Return now to consider a simple Smale plan with separation line
`. For such a plan the choices on the line ` were, in general, left
unspecified. Recall that if piX and piY are simple Smale plans with
separation lines `X and `Y then, except for the extreme cases when
both `X and `Y are the diagonal or both the co-diagonal (which requires
P ≤ 1
2
(T + S)), then if, eventually, X uses piX and Y uses piY the
sequence {sN} converges to the point of intersection `X ∩ Switch(`Y )
regardless of earlier play and regardless of the choices on the separation
lines.
To illustrate where the choices on the lines become important, let us
consider the extreme cases.
Suppose P < 1
2
(T +S) and pi is a simple Smale plan with separation
line the co-diagonal, ` = )(S, T ), (T, S)(. If both players use pi from
timeN∗ on then if sN
∗
is above ` then the sequence remains above ` con-
verging to (T, S). Similarly, if sN
∗
is below ` then the sequence remains
below ` and converges to (S, T ). If sN
∗ ∈ ` then the result depends on
the choice of pi on `. If pi(sN
∗
) = pi(Switch(sN
∗
)) = 1 then sN
∗+1 is
above ` with convergence to (T, S). If pi(sN
∗
) = pi(Switch(sN
∗
)) = 0,
then sN
∗+1 is below ` with convergence to (S, T ). Suppose that pi(s) = 0
if s ∈ ` with s above the diagonal and pi(s) = 1 if s ∈ ` on or below
the diagonal, then we again have alternating (S, T ) and (T, S) mo-
tion with limit 1
2
(T + S, T + S) unless the sequence lands on the point
1
2
(T + S, T + S) in which case we have convergence to (T, S).
Now let pi be the simple Smale plan with separation line ` the di-
agonal. Suppose that for s = (Q,Q) ∈ `, pi(s) = 1 if Q ≥ 1
2
(T + S)
and = 0 if Q < 1
2
(T + S). I think of this as the Smale version of
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Tit-for Tat. Suppose both players use pi for N ≥ N∗ and sN∗ 6∈ `. We
obtain alternating motion towards (T, S) and (S, T ) with limit point
1
2
(T + S, T + S) unless at some time N ≥ N∗, sN = (Q,Q) ∈ `. If
Q ≥ 1
2
(T + S) then we obtain outcomes cc for all rounds after N with
convergence to (R,R). If Q < 1
2
(T + S) then we obtain outcomes dd
for all rounds after N with convergence to (P, P ).
Thus, in both extreme cases, the limit results depend upon the pi
choices on the separation line.
4. Separation Paths and the Folk Theorem
This section is the result of some suggestions and questions raised
by Christian Hilbe in response to an earlier version.
Definition 4.1. We call a pair of Smale plans piX , piY a Nash Equi-
librium when the following hold:
(a) There is a point s∗ = (s∗X , s
∗
Y ) such that if X eventually plays
piX and Y eventually plays piY then the outcome sequence {sN}
converges to s∗. We then call s∗ the payoff to the pair.
(b) If Y eventually plays piY then any limit point V of an outcome
sequence satisfies VX ≤ s∗X , regardless of the play of X.
If X eventually plays piX then any limit point V of an outcome
sequence satisfies VY ≤ s∗Y , regardless of the play of Y.
That is, neither player can obtain an improved payoff by unilaterally
changing plans.
The so-called Folk Theorem of Iterated Play in this context should
say that for any s∗ ∈ S with s∗X , s∗Y ≥ P , there exists a Nash Equilib-
rium with payoff s∗.
With R ≥ s∗X , s∗Y ≥ P this is easy to obtain. If piX and piY are
the equalizer simple Smale plans with horizontal separation lines `X
given by sY = s
∗
Y and `Y given by sY = s
∗
X then the pair piX , piY is a
Nash equilibrium. In fact, as long as Y plays piY , the limit set Ω lies
in the vertical line Switch(`Y ) and X obtains s
∗
X regardless of his play
Consequently, X has no incentive to use piX . Similarly, for Y. So we
would like to strengthen condition (b) to the analogue of the Protection
Condition in this context.
Definition 4.2. We call a pair of Smale plans piX , piY a Strong Nash
Equilibrium when the following hold:
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(a) There is a point s∗ = (s∗X , s
∗
Y ) such that if X eventually plays
piX and Y eventually plays piY , then the outcome sequence {sN}
converges to s∗.
(b’) If Y eventually plays piY , then the point V = s
∗ is the only limit
point V of an outcome sequence with VX ≥ s∗X , regardless of the
play of X.
If X eventually plays piX , then the point V = s
∗ is the only limit
point V of an outcome sequence with VY ≥ s∗Y , regardless of the
play of Y.
Also, we would like to obtain Nash equilibrium results when s∗X or
s∗Y is greater than R.
To deal with the cases when P > 1
2
(T + S), we again let P¯ =
min(P, 1
2
(T + S)).
Definition 4.3. If s ∈ S then the upper triangle with vertex s, de-
noted T (s), is the triangle [s, (S, T ), (R,R)]. The lower quadrangle
with vertex s, denoted Q(s), is the convex set [s, (T, S), (P, P ), (P¯ , P¯ )].
A non-empty subset C ⊂ S is upper full if s ∈ C implies T (s) ⊂ C,
and lower full if s ∈ C implies Q(s) ⊂ C.
For C ⊂ S we let C◦ denote the S interior. Observe that if s is
on the segment [(S, T ), (R,R)] then T (s) is the segment with empty
interior. If P ≤ 1
2
(T + S) so that P¯ = P , then Q(s) is the triangle
[s, (T, S), (P, P )].
If C ⊂ S is nonempty, then the distance from s to C is d(s, C) =
inf{||s − sˆ|| : sˆ ∈ C}. For  ≥ 0, let C = {s ∈ S : d(s, C) ≤ }.
Observe that C0 is the closure of C.
Lemma 4.4. Let C be a nonempty subset of S and let  ≥ 0.
(a) If C is upper full, then it is connected and contains [(S, T ), (R,R)].
If C is lower full, then it is connected and contains [(T, S), (P, P ), (P¯ , P¯ )].
(b) If C is closed and is upper (or lower) full then C is upper full
(resp. lower full). In particular, the closure of C is upper full (resp.
lower full).
(c) The union C+ (or C−) of the upper triangles (resp. the lower
quadrangles) with vertices in C is an upper full (resp. lower full) subset
which is closed if C is.
(d) If C is convex then it is upper full if (S, T ), (R,R) ∈ C and it is
lower full if (T, S), (P, P ), (P¯ , P¯ ) ∈ C.
Proof: We prove the results for the upper case as the lower is similar.
(a) If C is upper full then it is a union of upper triangles, all of which
are connected and all of which contain [(S, T ), (R,R)]. Such a union is
connected.
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(b) Let 1 > . If r ∈ S then the segment [s, r] consists of the
points ts + (1 − t)r for all t ∈ [0, 1]. The upper triangle T (s) is the
union of the segments [s, r] with r ∈ [(S, T ), (R,R)]. If s1 ∈ S then
||(ts + (1 − t)r) − (ts1 + (1 − t)r)|| = t||s − s1|| ≤ ||s − s1||. Thus, if
s1 is 1 close to s, then every point of T (s1) is 1 close to a point of
T (s) and vice-versa. It follows that if C is upper full then C is upper
full. The lower quadrangle Q(s) is the union of the segments [s, r] with
r ∈ [(T, S), (P, P ), (P¯ , P¯ )].
(c) If s1 ∈ T (s), then the T (s1) ⊂ T (s) by convexity of T (s). Hence,
any union of upper triangles is upper full.
The set C+ is the image of the continuous map on C×[(S, T ), (R,R)]×
[0, 1] by (s, r, t) 7→ ts+(1−t)r. If C is closed, then the image is compact
and so is closed. The set C− is the image of the analogous continuous
map on C × [(T, S), (P, P ), (P¯ , P¯ )]× [0, 1]
(d) Obvious.
2
Because upper and lower fullness are generalizations of convexity,
the following is an extension of Corollary 2.10.
Proposition 4.5. Assume that eventually X plays a Smale plan pi, Y
uses an arbitrary plan and that the initial play is arbitrary. Let Ω be
the limit point set of an associated sequence of outcomes. Let C ⊂ S
be a nonempty closed set.
(a) If C is lower full and S \ C is contained in the defection zone
pi−1(0), then Ω ⊂ C.
(b) If C is upper full and S \ C is contained in the cooperation zone
pi−1(1), then Ω ⊂ C.
Proof: (a) Assume X plays piX after N
∗. For  > 0 let N > N∗
be an  step-time. If for all N ≥ N, sN ∈ S \ C, then after N the
outcomes are just as though X played All D. Hence, by Proposition 2.9
(b), Ω ⊂ [(T, S), (P, P )] ⊂ C. So we may assume that at some time
N1 > N, s
N1 ∈ C. We show by induction that for allN ≥ N1, sN ∈ C.
If sN ∈ C, then since N > N, ||sN+1 − sN || < , and so sN+1 ∈ C.
If sN ∈ C \C ⊂ pi−1(0), then SN+1 ∈ [(T, S), (P, P )] and so sN+1 is
in Q(sN) and so is contained in the lower full set C.
Since, eventually, sN is in the closed set C, it follows that Ω ⊂ C.
As  was arbitrary, Ω ⊂ ⋂>0 C = C.
The proof of (b) is completely analogous.
2
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Definition 4.6. A separation path is a closed, connected subset C ⊂ S
which meets the segments [(P¯ , P¯ ), (S, T )] and [(R,R), (T, S)] and which
satisfies
(*) If s ∈ C then T (s)◦ ∪Q(s)◦ is disjoint from C.
Note that if s ∈ [(S, T ), (R,R)] then T (s) has empty interior and so
is disjoint from C.
Recall that when P > 1
2
(T + S) the line )(S, T ), (P, P )( intersects
((R,R), (T, S)) at a point we label W¯ . We let W¯ denote the point
(T, S) when P ≤ 1
2
(T + S).
Theorem 4.7. Assume that C ⊂ S is a separation path with s ∈ C.
Let proj : C → [S, T ] be the restriction to C of the first coordinate
projection, i.e. proj(s) = sX .
(4.1) C+ ∪ C− = S and C+ ∩ C− = C.
(4.2) S\C− = C+\C = (C+)◦ and S\C+ = C−\C = (C−)◦.
(4.3) T (s)◦ ∩ C− = ∅ and Q(s)◦ ∩ C+ = ∅.
(4.4) Q(W¯ )◦ ∩ C = ∅.
The map proj is injective mapping C onto an interval [a, b] with
S ≤ a ≤ P¯ and R ≤ b ≤ T .
Proof: Since C meets [(S, T ), (P¯ , P¯ )] and [(R,R), (T, S)], C meets
[V−, V+] if V−, V+ = (S, T ), (P¯ , P¯ ) or if V−, V+ = (R,R), (T, S). If V− ∈
((P¯ , P¯ ), (T, S)) and V+ ∈ ((S, T ), (R,R)) then the segment [V−, V+]
separates the edges [(S, T ), (P¯ , P¯ )] and [(R,R), (T, S)] and so meets
the connected set C.
Let s0 ∈ C ∩ [V−, V+]. The half-open segment (s0, V+] is contained in
T (s0)
◦ and so (s0, V+] ⊂ C+ \C by Condition (*). Similarly, [V−, s0) ⊂
C− \ C. On the other hand, if s1 ∈ Q(s) ∩ [V−, V+] then [V−, s1) ⊂
Q(s1)
◦ ⊂ Q(s)◦. So Condition (*) implies s0 6∈ [V−, s1). Thus, Q(s) ∩
[V−, V+] ⊂ [V−, s0]. Similarly, T (s) ∩ [V−, V+] ⊂ [s0, V+]. Since s was
an arbitrary point of C, including the possibility s = s0, it follows that
C− ∩ [V−, V+] = [V−, s0] and C+ ∩ [V−, V+] = [s0, V+]. Thus, we have
[V−, V+]∩ (S\C−) = [V−, V+]∩ (C+ \C) = [V−, V+]∩ (C+)◦ = (s0, V +].
with analogous equations for [V−, s0). Because every point of S lies on
some such interval [V−, V+], equations (4.2) follow and clearly imply
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(4.1) . Since T (s)◦ ⊂ (C+)◦ and Q(s)◦ ⊂ (C−)◦, (4.2) implies (4.3), as
well.
If P ≤ 1
2
(T + S) then W¯ = (T, S) and Q(W¯ ) = [(P¯ , P¯ ), (T, S)] has
empty interior. P > 1
2
(T + S) then for all s ∈ Q(W¯ )◦, (P, P ) ∈ T (s)◦.
Since (P, P ) ∈ C−, (4.3) implies that s 6∈ C, proving (4.4).
The image proj(C) is a compact connected subset of [S, T ] ⊂ R.
Hence, it is a closed interval [a, b]. Since C meets [(S, T ), (P¯ , P¯ )] and
[(R,R), (T, S)], proj(C) meets the closed intervals [S, P¯ ] and [R, T ] in
R.
For t ∈ R with S ≤ t ≤ T let `t be the vertical line {sX = t}. For
t ∈ proj(C) with S < t < R the point V ′+ = `t ∩ )(S, T ), (R,R)( lies
in ((S, T ), (R,R)). Let st be the point of C ∩ `t with the smallest sY
coordinate. Since (st, V
′
+] ⊂ T (st)◦ it follows from Condition (*) that
C ∩ `t is the singleton {st}. Similarly, for t ∈ proj(C) with P¯ < t < T ,
`t meets ((P¯ , P¯ ), (T, S)) at a point V
′
−. Let s
t be the point of C ∩ `t
with the largest sY coordinate. [V
′
−, s
t) ⊂ Q(st)◦ and so C ∩ `t is the
singleton {st}. Finally, (S, T ) is the only point of S with sX = S and
(T, S) is the only point of S with sX = T . It follows that each vertical
line meets C in at most one point. Thus, proj is injective.
2
If ` is a separation line, then (S, T ) and (R,R) are on or above ` and
so for s ∈ ` ∩ S, T (s) ⊂ H+ and T (s)◦ ⊂ H+ \ `. Also, (P, P ) and
(T, S) are on or below `. Since (R,R) is on or above ` it follows that
(P¯ , P¯ ) is also on or below `. Thus, Q(s) ⊂ H− and Q(s)◦ ⊂ H− \ `. It
follows that ` ∩ S is a separation path. Call ` a strict separation line
when it is a separation line which does not contain (S, T ), (R,R), (T, S)
or (P, P ). That is, for a strict separation line ` the points (S, T ) and
(R,R) are strictly above ` and the points (T, S) and (P, P ) are strictly
below `. Furthermore, (P¯ , P¯ ) is strictly below ` as well, because if
(P¯ , P¯ ) 6= (P, P ) then P > 1
2
(T + S) and the only separation line with
(P¯ , P¯ ) on or above it is the diagonal which contains (P, P ). Thus, with
L an affine map associated with `, we have L(S, T ), L(R,R) > 0 and
L(T, S), L(P, P ), L(P¯ , P¯ ) < 0. It follows that:
(4.5) s ∈ ` ∩ S =⇒ (T (s) ∪Q(s)) ∩ ` = {s}.
By analogy, if C meets the segments [(S, T ), (P¯ , P¯ )] and [(R,R), (T, S)]
and satisfies the strengthening of Condition (*)
(4.6) s ∈ C =⇒ (T (s) ∪Q(s)) ∩ C = {s},
then we will call C a strict separation path.
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Recall that a function γ : [a, b]→ R is called piecewise C1 when γ is
continuous and there is a finite sequence a = a0 < a1 < · · · < an = b
so that γ is continuously differentiable on each subinterval [ai−1, ai]
for i = 1, . . . , n. Then at each point (t, γ(t)) with t ∈ [a, b) there is
a tangent line from the right and at each point with t ∈ (a, b] there
is a tangent line from the left. Except at the points with t = ai for
i = 0, . . . , n these two agree are both are the true tangent line at the
point.
Theorem 4.8. Assume that C is a subset of S.
(a) If C is a separation path then there exists a continuous function
γ : [a, b] → [S, T ] with S ≤ a ≤ P¯ , R ≤ b ≤ T such that C is
the graph of γ, i.e. C = {(t, γ(t)) : t ∈ [a, b]}.
(b) If C is a separation path which is the graph of a piece-wise C1
function γ, then every tangent line (i.e. every line tangent to a
point from the left or the right) is a separation line.
(c) Assume that C is the graph of a piece-wise C1 function with
(a, γ(a)) ∈ [(P¯ , P¯ ), (S, T )] and (b, γ(b)) ∈ [(R,R), (T, S)]. If
every tangent line is a strict separation line, then C is a strict
separation path.
(d) If C1 and C2 are separation paths, then C1∩Switch(C2) is non-
empty. If, in addition, one of them is a strict separation path,
then C1 ∩ Switch(C2) is a singleton set.
Proof: (a) As it is a continuous bijection on a compact set, proj :
C → [a, b] is a homeomorphism. If γ is the composition of proj−1 with
the projection to the sY coordinate then γ is a continuous map and
proj−1 is given by t 7→ (t, γ(t)).
For (b) and (c) we use s(t) for (t, γ(t)) with t ∈ [a, b].
(b) If t ∈ [a, b) then Condition (*) implies that for every t1 ∈ (t, b] the
secant line )s(t), s(t1)( passes through [(R,R), (T, S)]. Furthermore, if
t ≤ P , then (P, P ) is on or below the secant line. Passing to the limit,
the same is true for every tangent line from the right. Similarly, for
t ∈ (a, b] every tangent line from the left passes through [(S, T ), (P¯ , P¯ )]
and if t ≥ P then (P, P ) is on or below the tangent line from the left.
Thus, at the points of [a, b] \ {a0, . . . , an} the tangent line is a sep-
aration line. The remaining tangent lines from the left and right are
limits of true tangent lines and so are separation lines as well.
(c) The graph is a closed, connected set which meets [(S, T ), (P¯ , P¯ )]
and [(R,R), (T, S)] by hypothesis. If s ∈ Q(W¯ )◦ then no separation
line passes through s and so the graph is disjoint from Q(W¯ )◦.
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Let a ≤ t0 < b. Then (4.5) for the tangent line from the right implies
that, for sufficiently small h > 0, s(t0+h) 6∈ T (s(t0))∪Q((s0)). If s(t) ∈
T (s(t0))∪Q((s0)) for some t > t0 then we can let t∗ be the first entrance
time, i.e. t∗ = inf{t > t0 : s(t) ∈ T (s(t0)) ∪ Q((s0))} and let ` be the
tangent line from the left at s(t∗). Thus, s(t∗) is in the S topological
boundary of T (s(t0)) ∪ Q((s0)). The portion of the boundary with
sX > sX(t0) consists of (s(t0), (R,R)] and either (s(t0), (T, S)] or if
(P, P ) lies above this segment then (s(t0), (P, P )]∪((P, P ), (T, S)] (since
s(t0) 6∈ Q(W¯ )◦). If s(t∗) ∈ (s(t0), (R,R)] then because s(t1) is below
(s(t0), (R,R)] for t0 < t1 < t
∗ the point (R,R) lies below the secant
line )s(t1), s(t
∗)(. It follows that, in the limit, (R,R) is on or below `.
Similarly, if s(t∗) ∈ (s(t0), (T, S)] or s(t∗) ∈ ((P, P ), (T, S)] then (T, S)
is on or above `. Finally, if s(t∗) ∈ (s(t0), (P, P )] then (P, P ) is on or
above `.
Let a < t0 ≤ b. Then, for sufficiently small h > 0, s(t0 − h) 6∈
T (s(t0)) ∪ Q((s0)). If s(t) ∈ T (s(t0)) ∪ Q((s0)) for some t < t0 then
we can let t∗ be the first entrance time moving left, i.e. t∗ = sup{t <
t0 : s(t) ∈ T (s(t0)) ∪ Q((s0))} and let ` be the tangent line from the
right at s(t∗). The portion of the boundary with sX < sX(t0) consists
of (s(t0), (S, T )] and either (s(t0), (P¯ , P¯ )] or if (P, P ) lies above this
segment then (s(t0), (P, P )] ∪ ((P, P ), (P¯ , P¯ )](since s(t0) 6∈ Q(W¯ )◦).
As before s(t∗) ∈ (s(t0), (S, T )] implies (S, T ) is on or below `, and
s(t∗) ∈ (s(t0), (P¯ , P¯ )] or s(t∗) ∈ ((P, P ), (P¯ , P¯ )] implies (P¯ , P¯ ) is on or
above `. Finally, if s(t∗) ∈ (s(t0), (P, P )] then (P, P ) is on or above `.
In none of these cases can ` be a strict separation line. This proves
(4.6) for any t = t1. This in turn implies implies C is a separation
path.
(d) The connected set Switch(C2) meets [(S, T ), (R,R)] ⊂ C+1 and
[(P¯ , P¯ ), (T, S)] ⊂ C−1 . It follows from (4.1) for C1 that Switch(C2)
meets C1.
For any s ∈ S, (T (s)∪Q(s))∪ Switch((T (s)◦ ∪Q(s)◦) = S. Assume
that C1 is a strict separation path and that s1 ∈ S \ {s}. If s1 ∈ C1
then s1 6∈ (T (s)∪Q(s)). If s1 ∈ Switch(C2) then s1 6∈ Switch((T (s)◦∪
Q(s)◦). It follows that s1 6∈ C1 ∩ Switch(C2).
2
Remark: It is possible to extend (c) somewhat. It is easy to check
that the set of separation paths is itself closed in the space of closed
subsets of S equipped with the Hausdorff topology. So if {γn} is a
sequence of piecewise C1 functions which satisfy the conditions of (c)
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and the sequence of graphs converges in the appropriate sense to the
graph of γ then the graph of γ is a separation path.
Using simple geometric arguments similar to those in (c) above, we
can describe what occurs in a non-strict separation path. Since we will
not need the results, we leave the proof to the interested reader.
Proposition 4.9. Assume that s1 and s2 are distinct points of a sep-
aration path C.
(i) Let V−, V+ be one of the pairs (S, T ), (R,R) or (P, P ), (T, S) or
(P¯ , P¯ ), (P, P ). If C meets the open segment (V−, V+), then it
contains the closed segment [V−, V+].
(ii) Let V be one of the points (S, T ), (R,R), (T, S), (P, P ) or (P¯ , P¯ ).
If s2 lies in the open segment (s1, V ) then C contains the closed
segment [s1, s2].
2
Example 4.10. A differential equations construction for strict sepa-
ration paths.
For the example, we will restrict to the case P < 1
2
(T + S)and we
will just sketch the argument, leaving the details to the reader.
Define for s ∈ S
m+(s) =
{
(R− sY )/(R− sX) if sY ≥ sX
(sY − P )/(sX − P ) if sY ≤ sX .
m−(s) =
{
(T − sY )/(sX − S) if sY + sX ≥ T + S
(sY − S)/(T − sX) if sY + sX ≤ T + S.
(4.7)
So m+(s) = 1 if sY = sX and m
−(s) = 1 if sY + sX = T + S. If
s ∈ [(S, T ), (R,R)] or s ∈ [(P, P ), (T, S)] then m+(s) = −m−(s). Oth-
erwise, m+(s) > −m−(s). A line ` through s with slope m is a separa-
tion line iff m+(s) ≥ m ≥ −m−(s) and it is a strict separation line iff
both inequalities are strict.
Now let m be a real-valued, differentiable function on S with m(s) =
m+(s) = −m−(s) on [(S, T ), (R,R)]∪[(P, P ), (T, S)] and with m+(s) >
m(s) > −m−(s) otherwise.
Consider the differential equation dy
dx
= m(x, y) defined for s =
(x, y) ∈ S. Observe that [(S, T ), (R,R)] and [(P, P ), (T, S)] are both
solution curves for the differential equation. So by the uniqueness theo-
rem for ode’s every other solution curve remains in S\([(S, T ), (R,R)]∪
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[(P, P ), (T, S)]) and so by Theorem 4.8 (c) each of the remaining solu-
tion curves is a strict separation path.
2
Since the S intersection with a separation line is a separation path,
the following extends Corollary 2.8.
Corollary 4.11. Assume that eventually X plays a Smale plan pi, Y
uses an arbitrary plan and that the initial play is arbitrary. Let Ω be
the limit point set of an associated sequence of outcomes. If C is a
separation path such that C+ \C ⊂ pi−1(0) and C− \C ⊂ pi−1(1), then
Ω ⊂ C.
Proof: C+ is upper full with S \ C+ = C− \ C contained in the
cooperation zone and C− is lower full with S\C− = C+\C contained in
the defection zone. It follows from Proposition 4.5 that Ω ⊂ C+∩C− =
C.
2
Proposition 4.12. If s∗ = (s∗X , s
∗
Y ) ∈ S with P < s∗Y < R then there
is a strict separation path C such that s∗ is the unique point s ∈ C with
sY ≥ s∗Y .
Proof: First, assume s∗ 6∈ [(S, T ), (P¯ , P¯ )] ∪ [(R,R), (T, S)].
Choose V a point on the open segment ((S, T ), (P¯ , P¯ )) with P <
VY < s
∗
Y and so that )V, s
∗( intersects ((R,R), (T, S)). Choose W a
point on the open segment ((R,R), (T, S)) with P < WY < s
∗
Y and so
that )s∗,W ( intersects ((S, T ), (P¯ , P¯ )). The lines )V, s∗( and )s∗,W (
are strict separation lines.
Let C = [V, s∗]∪[s∗,W ]. While it is easy to check directly that C sat-
isfies (4.6), it follows from Theorem 4.8(c) that C is a strict separation
path. Clearly, s∗ is the unique point of C with maximum height.
If s∗ ∈ [(S, T ), (P¯ , P¯ )] then choose W as above so that ` =)s∗,W ( is
a strict separation line. If s∗ ∈ [(R,R), (T, S)] then choose V as above
so that ` =)s∗, V ( is a strict separation line. In either case, s∗ is the
point of maximum height on the segment ` ∩ S.
2
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Theorem 4.13. If s∗ = (s∗X , s
∗
Y ) ∈ S with P < s∗X , s∗Y then there is a
pair of Smale plans piX , piY which is a strong Nash equilibrium with s
∗
the payoff to the pair.
Proof: Case 1 (P < s∗X , s
∗
Y < R): Apply Proposition 4.12 to choose
CX a strict separation path with maximum point s
∗ and CY be a strict
separation path with maximum point Switch(s∗) = (s∗Y , s
∗
X). Let piX
and piY be Smale plans with
C+X \ CX ⊂ (piX)−1(0), C−X \ CX ⊂ (piX)−1(1),
C+Y \ CY ⊂ (piY )−1(0), C−Y \ CY ⊂ (piY )−1(1).
(4.8)
Corollary 4.11 and Theorem 4.8 (d) imply that when piX plays piY the
payoff is s∗ = CX∩Switch(CY ). If X uses an alternative plan, then the
limit set is contained in Switch(CY ), and similarly if Y varies against
piX .
Case 2 (s∗X = s
∗
Y = R): This is the good plan case studied in Section
3. Use piX = piY a simple Smale plan with the separation line through
(R,R) with slope m satisfying 0 < m < 1.
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Case 3 (P < s∗X < R ≤ s∗Y , or P < s∗Y < R ≤ s∗X): Notice
that if s ∈ S with sY > R, then sX < R. Furthermore, for the case
P < s∗Y < R ≤ s∗X it suffices to apply Switch to the other case. So we
will assume that P < s∗X < R ≤ s∗Y . To begin with we will also assume
that s∗ 6∈ [(R,R), (S, T )].
First we use Proposition 4.12, or more precisely its proof, to choose
CY a separation path with maximum point Switch(s
∗) = (s∗Y , s
∗
X).
That is, CY = [Switch(V ), Switch(s
∗)]∪[Switch(s∗), Switch(W )] with
V ∈ ((P¯ , P¯ ), (T, S)),W ∈ ((R,R), (S, T )), with P < VX ,WX < s∗X
and with the other conditions as described above. Let ` =)V, s∗(. Let
piY = 0 on C
+
Y \CY and = 1 on C−Y \CY . So regardless of the X plan, the
Switched limit set Switch(Ω) is contained in CY which has Switch(s
∗)
as it unique point of maximum height.
Next choose W ′ ∈ ((R,R), (T, S)) and V ′ ∈ [(S, T ), (P¯ , P¯ )] with
P < W ′Y = V
′
Y < R. So the horizontal line `
′ =)V ′,W ′( is a separation
line. Let CX = [V
′, s∗]∪ [s∗,W ′]. Let piX = 0 above CX and = 1 below
CX . Now despite the labeling, CX is not a separation path. The lower
full set C−X is the set of points on or below each of the lines )V
′, s∗( and
)s∗,W ′(, but the set of points on or above CX is not upper full. For
every point r ∈ [V ′, s∗), (r, s∗] ⊂ T (r)∗. On the other hand, Corollary
2.8 (c) applies to piX with C ⊂ C−X equal to the triangle [V ′, s∗,W ′]. So
regardless of the Y plan, the limit set Ω is contained in C which has s∗
as its unique point of maximum height.
To complete the proof we must show that if, after someN∗, X uses piX
and Y uses piY then the solution sequence converges to s
∗, i.e. Ω = {s∗}.
We know that Ω is contained in C ∩ Switch(CY ). If s¯ = ` ∩ `′, then
C ∩ Switch(CY ) is the segment K = [s∗, s¯]. Thus, given an arbitrary
δ > 0 there is an N δ > N∗ after which that the sequence remains δ
close to K.
Let δ > 0 be arbitrary. Within the δ ball Vδ(s
∗) we will build a box
which contains s∗ in its interior. Choose A ∈ (V ′, s∗) ∩ Vδ(s∗) close
enough to s∗ that the line `1 =)(S, T ), A( crosses ` within Vδ(s∗), i.e.
s′ = `1∩` ∈ Vδ(s∗). Choose B ∈ `1∩Vδ(s∗) so that s′ ∈ (A,B) ⊂ Vδ(s∗).
We may choose A close enough that the horizontal segment from B to
(s∗, V ′) is also in Vδ(s∗). Now let `2 =)(P, P ), B( and `3 =)(P, P ), A(.
Because (P, P ) lies below )V ′, s∗( and above ` =)V, s∗(, it follows that
s∗ is below `3 and above `2. We can choose A close enough to s∗
that B′ = `2 ∩ (s∗,W ′) and A′ = `1 ∩ (s∗,W ) lie in Vδ(s∗). This is
where we use s∗ 6∈ [(R,R), (S, T )]. Choose B′′ ∈ `2 ∩ Vδ(s∗), A′′ ∈
`1 ∩ Vδ(s∗) so that B′ ∈ (B,B′′) and A′ ∈ (A,A′′). The region of S
above both )s∗,W ′( and )s∗,W ( is convex, as is Vδ(s∗). It follows that
SMALE VS. MARKOV 39
the quadrilateral Box = [A,B,B′′, A′′] lies in Vδ(s∗) and contains s∗ in
its interior.
The various lines cut S into a -finite- number of regions and we
choose  < δ to be smaller than the distances between any two disjoint
such regions and small enough that the open neighborhood V(K) is
contained in the union of Box and C−, the convex set of points of S in
C or below `′ and, finally, small enough that V(Box) is contained in
Vδ(s
∗).
Let N > N
∗ be an  step-time so that for every N ≥ N the length
||sN+1− sN || is less than . Hence, no such small move crosses between
disjoint regions. Since Ω ⊂ K we can also choose N so that for every
N ≥ N sN ∈ V(K).
Suppose that for some N ≥ N, sN 6∈ Box. If sN lies to the left of `
then SN+1 = (R,R) and if sN lies to the right of ` then SN+1 = (S, T ).
For sN ∈ ` either SN+1 = (R,R) or SN+1 = (S, T ). For any such s
the (negative) slope of )(S, T ), s( is less than the slope of )(R,R), s(.
Thus from the left we move toward (R,R) and after crossing we move
toward (S, T ). The successive crossings are higher on K and thus our
net motion is upward until we enter Box. From Box it is easy to see
that exit could only occur from the triangle [s′, B, s∗] landing above the
horizontal line through B and  close to Box and so is still in Vδ(s
∗).
If it lands to the left of ` then the motion toward (R,R) is closer to
Box and so [sN , sN+1] ⊂ Vδ(s∗). If it lands to the right of ` then the
motion toward (S, T ) is upward, remaining above the B horizontal line
and so [sN , sN+1] ⊂ Vδ(s∗). Subsequent alternating moves are above
these initial ones and so remain in Vδ(s
∗) until the sequence re-enters
Box. It follows that eventually the sequence lies in Vδ(s
∗) and so the
limit point set Ω is contained in the closed ball of radius δ about s∗.
As δ > 0 was arbitrary, it follows that Ω = {s∗} as required.
Finally, we adjust the proof to deal with the case s∗ ∈ [(S, T ), (R,R)].
If s∗ = (R,R) we are in Case 2. Since s∗X > P , we have s
∗ 6= (S, T ).
We use CX as before. Now CY is the separation line ` =)s
∗, V ( with W
undefined. The points A,B,B′ and the lines `1, `2, `3 are chosen as be-
fore. This time, B′′ = `2∩)(S, T ), (R,R)( and A′′ = `3∩)(S, T ), (R,R)(.
Now s∗ is in the upper edge (A′′, B′′) which is nonetheless in the S inte-
rior of Box = [A,B,B′′, A′′]. With an easy adjustment of the previous
argument, one can again show that Ω is contained in the closed ball of
radius δ about s∗ and so conclude that Ω = {s∗}.
2
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5. Competition Among Simple Smale Plans
In this section we move beyond the classical question which mo-
tivated our original interest in good strategies. We consider now the
evolutionary dynamics among simple Smale plans. We follow Hofbauer
and Sigmund [11] Chapter 9 and Akin [2].
The dynamics that we consider takes place in the context of a sym-
metric two-person game, but generalizing our initial description, we
merely assume that there is a set of strategies indexed by a finite set I.
When players X and Y use strategies with index i, j ∈ I, respectively,
then the payoff to player X is given by Aij and the payoff to Y is Aji.
Thus, the game is described by the payoff matrix {Aij}. We imagine
a population of players each using a particular strategy for each en-
counter and let ξi denote the ratio of the number of i players to the
total population. The frequency vector {ξi} lives in the unit simplex
∆ ⊂ RI, i.e. the entries are nonnegative and sum to 1. The vertex v(i)
associated with i ∈ I corresponds to a population consisting entirely
of i players. Thus, ξ = v(i) exactly when ξi = 1. We assume the
population is large so that we can regard ξ as changing continuously
in time.
Now we regard the payoff in units of fitness. That is, when an i player
meets a j player in an interval of time dt, the payoff Aij is an addition to
the background reproductive rate ρ of the members of the population.
So the i player is replaced by 1 + (ρ+Aij)dt i players. Averaging over
the current population distribution, the expected relative reproductive
rate for the subpopulation of i players is ρ+ Aiξ, where
Aiξ = Σj∈ I ξjAij and
Aξξ = Σi∈ I ξiAiξ = Σi,j ∈ I ξiξjAij.
(5.1)
The resulting dynamical system on ∆ is given by the Taylor-Jonker
Game Dynamics Equations introduced in Taylor and Jonker [21].
(5.2)
dξi
dt
= ξi(Aiξ − Aξξ).
This system is an example of the replicator equation systems studied
in great detail in Hofbauer and Sigmund [11].
We will need some general game dynamic results for later application.
Fix the game matrix {Aij}.
A subset A of ∆ is called invariant if ξ(0) ∈ A implies that the entire
solution path lies in C. That is, ξ(t) ∈ A for all t ∈ R. An invariant
point is an equilibrium.
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Each nonempty subset J of I determines the face ∆J of the simplex
consisting of those ξ ∈ ∆ such that ξi = 0 for all i 6∈ J. Each face
of the simplex is invariant because ξi = 0 implies that
dξi
dt
= 0. In
particular, for each i ∈ I the vertex v(i), which represents fixation at
the i strategy, is an equilibrium.
In general, ξ is an equilibrium when, for all i, j ∈ I, ξi, ξj > 0 imply
Aiξ = Ajξ, or, equivalently, Aiξ = Aξξ for all i such that ξi > 0, i.e. for
all i in the support of ξ.
An important example of an invariant set is the omega limit point
set of an orbit. Given an initial point ξ ∈ ∆ with associated solution
path ξ(t), it is defined by intersecting the closures of the tail values.
(5.3) ω(ξ) =
⋂
t>0
{ξ(s) : s ≥ t}.
By compactness this set is nonempty. A point is in ω(ξ) iff it is the
limit of some sequence {ξ(tn)} with {tn} tending to infinity. The set
ω(ξ) consists of a single point ξ∗ iff Limt→∞ξ(t) = ξ∗. In that case,
{ξ∗} is an invariant point, i.e. an equilibrium.
Notice that this is the analogue for the solution path of the limit
point set Ω of a payoff sequence, considered in the previous sections.
Definition 5.1. We call a strategy i∗ a evolutionarily stable strategy
(hereafter, an ESS) when
(5.4) Aji∗ < Ai∗i∗ for all j 6= i∗ in I.
Remark: We follow [5] in labeling this condition ESS although it
is stronger than the condition originally introduced in [13]. In [11]
precisely this condition is called a strict Nash equilibrium and so this
language requires a bit of justification.
In the pure game theory context we regard a distribution ξ over
I as a mixed-strategy rather than a population distribution of pure
strategists. Then a pair ξ1, ξ2 is a Nash equilibrium when each is a best
reply against the other. That is, for all distributions η,
(5.5) Aηξ2 ≤ Aξ1ξ2 and Aηξ1 ≤ Aξ2ξ1 .
Notice that from this we see that
(ξ1)j > 0 =⇒ Ajξ2 = Aξ1ξ2 and
(ξ2)j > 0 =⇒ Ajξ1 = Aξ2ξ1 .
(5.6)
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That is, all of the pure strategies active in ξ1 are best replies to ξ2 and
vice-versa. In the context of Smale strategies this is the concept used
in the previous section.
Following [2] we call the pair a regular Nash equilibrium when, in
addition to (5.5),
(ξ1)j = 0 =⇒ Ajξ2 < Aξ1ξ2 and
(ξ1)j = 0 =⇒ Ajξ2 < Aξ1ξ2 .
(5.7)
That is, the pure strategies active in ξ1 are all of the pure strategies
which give the best reply to ξ2 and vice-versa.
Returning to the dynamic context, a distribution ξ is called a (regu-
lar) Nash equilibrium when the pair ξ, ξ is a (regular) Nash equilibrium
in the above sense. From (5.6) we see that a Nash equilibrium is an
equilibrium for the Taylor-Jonker equations as defined above. When ξ
is the vertex v(i∗) then it is a regular Nash equilibrium exactly when
it is a strict Nash equilibrium as defined on page 62 of [11], or, equiv-
alently, (5.4) holds.
Proposition 5.2. If i∗ is an ESS then the vertex v(i∗) is an attractor,
i.e. a locally stable equilibrium, for the system (5.2). In fact, there
exists  > 0 such that
(5.8) 1 > ξi∗ ≥ 1−  =⇒ dξi∗
dt
> 0.
Thus, near the equilibrium v(i∗), which is characterized by ξi∗ = 1, ξi∗(t)
increases monotonically, converging to 1 and the alternative strategies
are eliminated from the population in the limit.
Proof: When i∗ is an ESS, Ai∗i∗ > Aji∗ for all j 6= i∗. It then follows
for  > 0 sufficiently small that ξi∗ ≥ 1 −  implies Ai∗ξ > Ajξ for all
j 6= i∗. If also 1 > ξi∗ , then Ai∗ξ > Aξξ. So (5.2) implies (5.8).
2
Definition 5.3. For J a nonempty subset of I we say a strategy i
weakly dominates a strategy j in J when i, j ∈ J and
(5.9) Ajk ≤ Aik for all k ∈ J,
with strict inequality for k = i or k = j. If the inequalities are strict
for all k then we say that i dominates j in J.
We say that i ∈ J weakly dominates a sequence {j1, ..., jn} in J when
there exists 1 ≤ m ≤ n such that i weakly dominates jp in J for p =
1, . . . ,m and for p = m+ 1, ..., n, i dominates jp in J \ {j1, ..., jp−1}.
When J equals all of I we will omit the phrase “in J”.
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Proposition 5.4. For i ∈ I, let ξ(t) be a solution path with ξi(0) > 0
(a) If i weakly dominates j then Limt→∞ ξj(t) = 0.
(b) If i weakly dominates the sequence {j1, ..., jn} then for j = j1, ..., jn,
Limt→∞ ξj(t) = 0.
Proof: (a): The face {ξ : ξj = 0} is invariant. So if ξj(0) = 0 then
ξj(t) = 0 for all t and so it is 0 in the limit. Thus, we may assume
ξj(0) > 0.
For i, j ∈ I, define the open set Qij and on it the real valued function
Hij by
Qij = {ξ ∈ ∆ : ξi, ξj > 0}
Hij(ξ) = ln(ξi)− ln(ξj).(5.10)
Let h0 = Hij(ξ(0)).
Observe that on Qij
(5.11) dHij/dt = Aiξ − Ajξ = Σk∈ Iξk(Aik − Ajk) > 0.
Hence, Hij(ξ(t)) is a strictly increasing function of t on the open
invariant set Qij. Thus, as a t tends to infinity Hij(ξ(t)) approaches
h∞ = sup{Hij(ξ(t)) : t ≥ 0} with h0 < h∞ ≤ +∞.
We must prove that ξj = 0 on the omega limit set. Assume instead
that ξ∗ ∈ ω(ξ(0)) with ξ∗j > 0. If ξ∗i were 0 then Hij(ξ(t)) would
not be bounded below on {ξ(t) : t ≥ 0}. Hence, ξ∗ lies in Qij with
h∞ = Hij(ξ∗) < ∞. So on the invariant set ω(ξ(0)) ∩ Qij, which
contains ξ∗, and so is nonempty, Hij would be constantly h∞ < ∞.
Since this set is invariant, dHij/dt would equal zero. This contradicts
(5.11) which implies that the derivative is positive on ω(ξ(0)) ∩Qij.
The proof of (b) is a variation of the proof of (a). We refer to
[5] Proposition 4.6. An obvious adjustment of the initial step in the
inductive proof of (b) there yields the proof here.
2
Corollary 5.5. Assume I = {i∗, j1, . . . , jn} and i∗ ∈ I weakly domi-
nates the sequence {j1, ..., jn}. If ξi∗(0) > 0 then limt→∞ ξi∗(t) = 1.
Proof: By Proposition 5.4 ξjp(t) → 0 for all p = 1, . . . , n and so
ξi∗(t) = 1− Σnp=1ξjp(t)→ 1.
2
In [5], see also [3], we examined competition among certain spe-
cial Markov plans called Zero-Determinant Plans. It was proved that
good Markov plans among them are attractors when competing against
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plans which are not agreeable. In addition, global stability was proved
when the class of competitors was further restricted. Here we will
similarly consider competition among simple Smale plans. Let I =
{i∗, j1, . . . , jn} index a list of simple Smale plans with pii associated
with separation line `i for i ∈ I. Except for the extreme cases the
intersection `i ∩ Switch(`j) is a single point. For pi the plan with `
the diagonal we will assume that the plan is weakly agreeable and that
the initial play is c. So if X and Y both play pi the payoff is (R,R).
If P ≤ 1
2
(T + S) then the co-diagonal is a separation line and we will
adopt the convention that if both players use co-diagonal plans then
the payoff is 1
2
(T + S, T + S). If X plays pii and Y plays pij we will let
(Aij, Aji) be the coordinates of the payoff point with the above con-
ventions in the extreme cases. We will then use (5.2) to represent the
dynamics of the competition with ξi the fraction of the pii players in
the population.
Notice that if Y plays an equalizer plan pij with `j horizontal then
Aij = Ai′j for any plans pii and pii′ for X. In particular, if all of the plans
are equalizer plans then Aiξ = Ai′ξ for all i, i
′ ∈ I and so Aiξ = Aξξ for
all i ∈ I and for any population state ξ. Thus, the dynamics is trivial
and every state ξ is an equilibrium.
Now we consider the case when `i∗ is a protection line. That is, `i∗ is
a line through (R,R) with slope m satisfying 0 < m ≤ 1. Notice that
m = 1 is the diagonal line case. If m < 1 and pii∗(R,R) = 1 then pii∗ is
a good simple Smale plan.
Theorem 5.6. If `i∗ is a protection line and (R,R) 6∈ `j for any j ∈
I \ {i∗} then i∗ is an ESS and so fixation at i∗ is an attractor.
Proof: Ai∗i∗ = R. If Y plays pii∗ and X plays pij for j ∈ I \{i∗} then
the payoff point is not (R,R) and so Aji∗ and Ai∗j are both less than
R because `i∗ is a protection line. This implies (5.4) and so the result
follows from Proposition 5.2.
2
Since ξi∗(0) = 0 implies ξi∗(t) = 0 for all t the best stability result we
can hope for is that every solution with ξi∗(0) > 0 converges to fixation
at i∗. We will call this global stability.
As an illustration we describe a very special case.
Theorem 5.7. Assume that `i∗ is a protection line. If for every j ∈
I \ {i∗}, `j is a horizontal line {sY = Cj} with P ≤ Cj < R, then for
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every j ∈ I \ {i∗}, i∗ weakly dominates j and so the system exhibits
global stability.
Proof: Because `i∗ is a protection line, we have, as in Theorem 5.6,
Aji∗ < Ai∗i∗ = R. For any k ∈ I \ {i∗}, Ck = Ajk = Ai∗k for all j ∈ I
and weak domination, (5.9), follows. A fortiori, i∗ weakly dominates
the sequence {j1, . . . , jn} and the result follows from Corollary 5.5.
2
We will show that we achieve global stability if pii∗ is good, (R,R) 6∈
`j for any j ∈ I \ {i∗} and, in addition, all the lines `j have positive
slope. This requires a bit of geometry.
Lemma 5.8. Assume that `i∗ is a protection line, (R,R) 6∈ `k for any
k ∈ I \ {i∗} and that `k has non-negative slope for every k ∈ I. If for
some i¯ ∈ I the segment ¯`i ∩ S lies below `i∗ then i∗ weakly dominates i¯.
Proof: As usual Ai¯i∗ < Ai∗i∗ = R. For any k ∈ I the line Switch(`k)
is either vertical or has positive slope. Let V¯ , V ∗ be the intersection
points of Switch(`k)∩ ¯`i and Switch(`k)∩`i∗ , respectively. If Switch(`k)
is vertical then the X coordinates of V¯ and V ∗ are equal. If Switch(`k)
has positive slope then V ∗ is above and to the right of V¯ and so has a
larger X coordinate. Thus, Ai¯k ≤ Ai∗k, proving weak domination.
2
Now we assume that the slope of `i∗ < 1, i.e. `i∗ is not the diag-
onal. Let V be the point of intersection `i∗ ∩ )(S, T ), (P¯ , P¯ )(, where
P¯ = min(P, 1
2
(T + S)). Thus, `i∗ ∩ S \ (R,R) = [V, (R,R)) and the
entire half-open segment lies above the diagonal. Now let `j be a sep-
aration line which does not contain (R,R). So it contains a point A ∈
((R,R), (T, S)]. Let B be the intersection point `j ∩ )(S, T ), (P¯ , P¯ )(. If
B lies below `i∗ then the entire segment `j∩S lies below `i∗ . Otherwise,
B ∈ [V, (S, T )] and this is the situation we wish to examine.
Since A is below `i∗ and B is on or above `i∗ it follows that `j
intersects `i∗ at a point V
j of S with V jX its X coordinate. Notice
that the portion of `j to the right of V
j lies below `i∗ . In any case,
Switch(`j) intersects `i∗ at a point W
j with X coordinate W jX .
Lemma 5.9. If `j has non-negative slope then V
j
X < W
j
X .
Proof: The lines `j and Switch(`j) meet the diagonal at a common
point (Q,Q) = `j ∩ Switch(`j). To the right of {sX = Q} the line
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`j lies below the diagonal, because A is below the diagonal. On the
other hand, all of `i∗ ∩ S \ (R,R) lies above the diagonal. Hence,
V jX < Q. Similarly, Switch(`j) intersects `i∗ above the diagonal. Since
Switch(`j) is either vertical or has positive slope, it follows that Q ≤
W jX .
2
From this we obtain the main result of this section.
Theorem 5.10. {pii : i ∈ I} be a finite indexed collection of simple
Smale plans with `i the separation line for pii. Assume that for some
i∗ ∈ I, `i∗ is a line through (R,R) with slope strictly between 0 and 1
and (R,R) 6∈ `j for any j ∈ I \ {i∗}. If `i has non-negative slope for
all i ∈ I and, in addition, `i ∩ S lies below `i∗ for those i ∈ I with `i
horizontal, then fixation at i∗ is a globally stable equilibrium. That is,
if ξi∗(0) > 0 then limt→∞ ξi∗(t) = 1.
Proof: We choose a numbering of the n elements of I \ {i∗} by
letting j1, ..., jm with 0 ≤ m ≤ n so that `j ∩S lies below `i∗ if and only
if j = jp for some p ≤ m. If no such exist then m = 0 and the set is
empty.
For the remaining `j’s the slope is positive and the numbers V
j
X
and W jX are defined as above. Number them so that V
jp
X ≤ V jp+1X for
m < p < n.
By Corollary 5.5 it suffices to show that i∗ weakly dominates the
sequence {j1, . . . , jn}.
To begin with i∗ weakly dominates each jp for p ≤ m by Lemma 5.8.
We must show that if m < p ≤ n then i∗ dominates jp in
{i∗, jp, jp+1, . . . , jn}.
As before, Ajpi∗ < Ai∗i∗ . Now let k ∈ {jp, jp+1, . . . , jn}.
Because of the chosen numbering and Lemma 5.9 we have V
jp
X ≤
V kX < W
k
X . That is, intersection point W
k of Switch(`k) ∩ `i∗ lies
to the right of V jp . The slope of Switch(`k) is greater than 1 and the
slope of `i∗ is less than 1. Hence, Switch(`k) is above `i∗ to the right of
W k and below `i∗ to the left. It follows that Switch(`k) intersects the
vertical line {sX = V jpX } below V jp and so below the line `jp , because
V jp lies on `jp . Again Switch(`k) has slope greater than 1 and `jp has
slope less than one. So Switch(`k) intersects `jp to the right of this
vertical line. Right of this V jp vertical line, `jp lies below `i∗ . As in
Lemma 5.8 the intersection point Switch(`k) ∩ `jp lies below and to
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the right of W k = Switch(`k) ∩ `i∗ That is, Ajpk < Ai∗k. Thus, i∗
dominates jp in {i∗, jp, jp+1, . . . , jn}, as required.
2
6. Variations
Following Smale we consider alternative weighting schemes.
Let {w1, w2, . . . } be an infinite sequence of positive numbers. Let
WN = Σ
N
k=1 wk and ∆N = Σ
N
k=1|wk+1 − wk|. Consider the conditions:
• (Weight Condition 1) limN→∞ wNWN = 0.• (Weight Condition 2) limN→∞ WN = ∞.
• (Weight Condition 3) limN→∞ ∆NWN = 0.
Lemma 6.1. Condition (3) implies Conditions (1) and (2). If the
sequence {wn} is monotonically non-increasing or non-decreasing, then
Conditions (1) and (2) imply Condition (3).
Proof: ∆N ≥ |wN+1−w1|. So (3) implies |wN+1−w1|WN → 0. If |wn+1−
w1| ≤ 12w1 infinitely often then wn+1 > 12w1 infinitely often and so
the increasing sequence {WN} is unbounded, implying (2). Otherwise,
eventually |wn+1−w1| > 12w1 and so w12WN → 0 which implies (2). Then
wn+1 ≤ w1 + |wn+1 − w1| and so wN+1WN+1 <
wN+1
WN
→ 0 which is (1).
Condition (1) implies WN
WN+1
= 1 − wN+1
WN+1
→ 1. Hence, (1) implies
wN+1
WN
→ 0. Condition (2) implies w1
WN
→ 0.
If the sequence {wn} is monotone then the sum defining ∆N tele-
scopes to yield ∆N = |wN+1 − w1|. So in that case (1) and (2) imply
(3).
2
If the sequence is non-increasing then (1) certainly holds and (2) says
that the sequence does not decrease so fast that the associated series
converges. If the sequence is non-decreasing then (2) certainly holds
and (1) says that the sequence does not increase too fast. For example,
if wN+1 ≥ WN then wN+1WN+1 ≥ 1+ .
The initial averaging procedure that we used had wn = 1 for all n
and so WN = N .
Since the averaging procedure uses ratios we may multiply by a pos-
itive constant and so assume w1 = 1 and hence WN ≥ 1 for all N .
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Now assume that {wn} is a positive sequence with w1 = 1 and Con-
ditions (1) and (2) hold.
We replace our previous averaging of the payoff sequence in (2.4) to
define
(6.1) sN =
1
WN
ΣNk=1 wkS
k.
We obtain the analogues of (2.5) and (2.6).
(6.2) sN+1 =
WN
WN+1
sN +
wN+1
WN+1
SN+1.
and so
(6.3) sN+1 − sN = wN+1
WN+1
(SN+1 − sN).
By Condition (1) (6.1) implies that ||sN+1 − sN || → 0 and so the
limit point set is connected as before. However, the crucial fact is (6.2)
which says that sN+1 is on the segment [SN+1, sN ] with the weight on
sN approaching 1 as N →∞. Consequently, all of the linear estimates
for Smale plans go through as before. The only change is that the
numerical estimates MN∗/N are replaced by MWN∗/WN which tends
to 0 as N →∞ by Condition (2). In particular, when two non-extreme,
simple Smale plans compete we obtain convergence to the intersection
point regardless of the averaging procedure.
It is the similar result for Markov plans that requires Condition (3).
Suppose that M is the Markov matrix when X plays p and Y plays
q. Let v1 be the initial distribution and vn+1 = vnM, the distribution
after round n+ 1. Define
(6.4) v¯N =
1
WN
ΣNk=1 wkv
k.
It follows that
(6.5) v¯NM =
1
WN
ΣNk=1 wkv
k+1 =
1
WN
ΣN+1k=2 wk−1v
k.
Since the length of a distribution is at most 1 we have that
(6.6) ||v¯N − v¯NM|| ≤ w1 + wN+1 + ∆N
WN
.
From Condition (3) it follows that any limit point of the sequence
{v¯N} is a stationary distribution. In particular if there is a unique
terminal set and so a unique stationary distribution v then {v¯N} con-
verges to v. If J is one of several terminal sets then with probability
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pJ , depending only on then initial distribution, v
1, the sequence of out-
comes enters J . The conditional distributions assuming entrance into
J then converge to the unique stationary distribution on J .
In contrast with all this, there is another sort of natural averaging
which does not work. Suppose we use
(6.7) sN =
1
WN
ΣNk=1 wkS
N+1−k.
With Condition (3) one can still show that ||sN+1 − sN || → 0, but
this time sN+1 is not on the segment [SN+1, sN ] except when all the wn
are equal, in which case the two sorts of averaging agree (This is the
original wn = 1 for all n case). So the results from the first section will
not carry over.
The other variation to consider is a asymmetric version of the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma with payoffs given by
(6.8)
X\Y c d
c (RX , RY ) (SX , TY )
d (TX , SY ) (PX , PY )
and with inequalities for X and for Y analogous to those of (2.3).
This is a real issue because in the classic version of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma the payoffs are not in units of dollars, time reduced from a
prison sentence or population fitness, but in terms of utility and there
is no reason that the two players would have the same Von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility functions.
At first glance, there is no problem. In [4] the good Markov strategies
are characterized for the asymmetric case. In [18] Smale points out
that the theory will work the same way for the asymmetric case. Now
one must describe separate Smale strategies for Y, rather than using
pi◦Switch, but as he indicates the mathematics is essentially the same.
There is, however, an underlying philosophical problem. In [4] the
inequalities for a good plan for X use the payoffs for Y, which, in theory,
X does not know. In the Markov case, this is not too bad because only
a rough estimate is needed to ensure that the strategy is good.
In the Smale case, the running averages use the payoffs to both
players. Perhaps the best way to proceed would be to begin again and
operate, not in the two dimensional convex set generated by the payoff
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pairs but in the three dimensional simplex of outcomes. That is, let
ecc = (1, 0, 0, 0), ecd = (0, 1, 0, 0),
edc = (0, 0, 1, 0), edd = (0, 0, 0, 1).
(6.9)
The convex hull S′ with these vertices is the simplex of distributions
on the four outcomes. The data we use from the sequence of outcomes
{o1, . . . , oN} is the frequency of past outcomes:
(6.10) sN =
1
N
ΣNk=1eok .
so that, analogous with (2.5)
(6.11) sN+1 =
1
N + 1
oN+1 +
N
N + 1
sN .
A plan for X is then a map pi : S′ → [0, 1] with pi(s) the probability of
cooperating in response to position s. So a pure strategy plan, of the
sort Smale uses would be a map pi : S′ → {0, 1}.
Linear results analogous to those of Section 2 can then be carried
over. Nonetheless, determining what is a good plan would still require
some estimate of the opponent’s payoffs. This is a task for another day.
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